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INTRODUCTION
With the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Lopez,1 the Court began its long effort to reverse the sixty-year trend 
toward increasing federal dominion over traditionally local activities.  
Surprising to many at the time of its decision, Lopez signaled the mod-
ern Court’s resistance to allowing Congress to exercise a general legis-
lative power through the Commerce Clause, particularly in cases in-
volving non-economic criminal activity.2
Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA),3
which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within one thou-
sand feet of a school.4  The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, held that Congress did not have the power to pass the 
law because it was not substantially related to interstate commerce.5
In so doing, the Court announced a new framework for deciding 
whether a particular statute is within Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.6  Under this new framework, the Court will be ex-
tremely deferential to Congress in cases involving statutes that regu-
late some form of economic activity, but less so in evaluating regula-
tions that involve non-economic activity.7  The Court found that the 
GFSZA involved non-economic activity, and struck down the law after 
determining that the regulated activity did not substantially affect in-
terstate commerce.8
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
2 See infra Part II.A.1. 
3 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (1990) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2006)). 
4 See id., 104 Stat. at 4845 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(B)) (defining 
“school zone” as “within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, paro-
chial or private school”). 
5 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (striking down the GFSZA because possession of a gun 
in a school zone could not be shown to substantially affect interstate commerce). 
6 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (noting that Lopez “pro-
vides the proper framework” for analyzing a statute under the Commerce Clause). 
7 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
8 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11. 
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To an outside observer, neither the Court’s holding nor its rea-
soning is very surprising.  Merely possessing a gun in a school zone 
does not seem like an activity that would substantially affect interstate 
commerce, and it makes sense that the Court would be suspicious of 
Congress’s attempts to criminalize this type of non-economic activity 
under its power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”9
What made Lopez such a shocking turn of events, however, is the fact 
that it marked the first time since 1937 that the Supreme Court had 
struck down a federal statute on the grounds that it was beyond Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.10  Beginning with the Su-
preme Court’s landmark decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.,11 the Commerce Clause had been regarded as a general grant of 
legislative power, and, indeed, Congress had used it as such.12  The 
shock of Lopez came not from its outcome, but from its stunning de-
parture from established Commerce Clause precedent. 
Rather than overrule the previous sixty years of Commerce Clause 
cases, Lopez reinterpreted many of the earlier cases to make them fit 
within its new framework.  While Lopez was a surprising shift in Com-
merce Clause doctrine at the time of the Court’s decision, two major 
subsequent cases, United States v. Morrison13 and Gonzales v. Raich,14
have reinforced the Lopez framework and continued the effort to pull 
back on what the Court has seen as the increasing federalization of 
control over traditionally local activities.  Since 1995, federal courts 
have been more willing to strike down federal laws as exceeding Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause, particularly those laws that 
have dealt with non-economic criminal activities.15
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
10 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) 
(“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of 
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.”). 
11 See 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (upholding legislation that, in aggregate, has a “close 
and substantial relationship to interstate commerce”). 
12 See THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 103-04 
(Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (claiming that through its decisions between 1937 
and 1995 the Court “turned the commerce power into the equivalent of a general 
regulatory power and undid the Framers’ original structure of limited and delegated 
powers”); Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 2 (observing that before Lopez, the commerce 
power was the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation under which 
countless criminal and civil laws were enacted). 
13 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
14 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A, which prohibited knowing possession of child pornography, was 
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During this same time, some high-profile and gruesome murders 
caught national headlines and led many prominent politicians and 
civil rights leaders to join in a call for stronger federal laws against bias-
motivated crimes of violence, or “hate crimes.”16  On June 7, 1998, 
James Byrd, Jr., an African-American man, accepted a ride home from 
three men who turned out to be white supremacists.17  Rather than 
driving him home, the three men took him to a secluded area where 
they beat him, chained him to the back of a pickup truck, and 
dragged him for three miles along a paved road.18  Medical examiners 
believed that Byrd lived through most of this until a collision with a 
drainage culvert ripped his head and torso from his body.19
Later that same year, on October 7, 1998, two men murdered Mat-
thew Shepard, a homosexual college student, after they became en-
raged when Shepard made sexual advances toward them.20  The two 
men kidnapped Shepard, beat him, tied him to a fence like a scare-
crow, and left him to die.21  A biker found Shepard the next day, barely 
alive.22  After five days in a coma, Shepard died from his injuries.23
unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose intrastate possession of child por-
nography had too attenuated a connection to intrastate commerce), vacated, 546 U.S. 
801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006); Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act), rev’d, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Brzon-
kala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the authority to enact a federal 
civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence), aff’d, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.  But see
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the 
Supreme Court Held A Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369, 
371, 378-91 (describing the ways in which lower courts have applied Lopez and finding 
that, although some courts have been willing to strike down federal statutes based on 
that decision, most have tended to limit it to its facts). 
16 See Cordula Meyer, Liberty Bell Rally Seeks Protection for Gays Through Hate-Crime 
Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 23, 1998, at B2 (describing the actions of individuals in 
Philadelphia to influence legislators to create hate crime laws that protect gays and 
lesbians in Pennsylvania); see also Dan Hasenstab, Comment, Is Hate a Form of Commerce?  
The Questionable Constitutionality of Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
973, 973-74 (2001) (noting the connection between these high-profile murders and 
the push to enact federal hate crime legislation). 
17 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 238 
(2005).
18 Id. at 238-39. 
19 Id.
20 Tom Kenworthy, Gay College Student Who Was Beaten Dies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 
13, 1998, at 20. 
21 James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 1998, at A9. 
22 Id.
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These two brutal murders set off a firestorm of national attention 
as political leaders such as President Clinton and Attorney General 
Janet Reno joined with civil rights leaders to call for national hate 
crime legislation.24  In the months that followed, Senator Edward 
Kennedy responded by proposing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
1999,25 which would have made it a federal offense to commit a crime 
of violence motivated by the victim’s race, religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, or disability.26  Although this bill never became law, it has 
been reintroduced in each Congress since that time.27
Recently, the debate over hate crime legislation has again heated 
up, spurred in part by the events surrounding the “Jena 6” and the 
subsequent wave of noose hangings throughout the country.  In Au-
gust 2006, white students at Jena High School in Jena, Louisiana, 
hung two nooses from a tree in the school’s courtyard—apparently as 
a signal to black students not to gather near the tree.28  The students 
23 Gay Student Dies; 2 Face Murder Charges, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 
1998, at A1. 
24 See Carla Crowder, Clinton Saddened by Wyo. ‘Hate’ Assault:  President Says Beating of 
Shepard Shows Need to Pass Hate-Crimes Bill, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Oct. 11, 
1998 (discussing President Clinton’s call for national hate crime legislation that would 
cover crimes motivated by sexual-orientation bias in response to Matthew Shepard’s 
murder); House Expresses Dismay at Murder of Gay Student in Wyoming, WASH. POST, Oct. 
16, 1998, at A24 (noting how Matthew Shepard’s murder motivated Congress to con-
sider laws that would broaden hate crime punishments and make it easier for federal 
law enforcement to prosecute such crimes); Charles A. Radin, Kennedy Vows Push for 
New Rights Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1998, at B2 (citing Senator Kennedy’s opin-
ion that the murders of Byrd and Shepard made federal hate crime laws particularly 
necessary); Reno Urges Matthew Shepard Law, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 19, 1998, at 
2A (“Attorney General Janet Reno urged Congress to expand federal hate crime laws 
to include offenses based on sexual orientation, saying that the brutal slaying of gay 
Wyoming student Matthew Shepard shows that the government must take a stronger 
stand.”).
25 S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999). 
26 Id. § 4. 
27 See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
28 Mary Mitchell, Did Civil Rights Movement Pass Louisiana By?  Racist Incident Leads 
to Harsh Justice for Black Students, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at 12.  The true story of 
what happened in Jena seems to be controversial.  Craig Franklin, a local reporter in 
Jena whose wife taught for many years at Jena High School, claims that the commonly 
accepted story is largely a creation of the media.  Among other disputes with the com-
monly accepted facts, Franklin claims that the nooses were not hung as a message to 
black students not to sit under the tree, but rather as a prank aimed at fellow white 
students who were members of the school’s rodeo team.  According to Franklin, the 
students who hung the nooses had no idea about the nooses’ racial connotations and 
expressed sincere remorse when told.  See Craig Franklin, Media Myths About the Jena 6,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2007, at 9.  Whatever the true version of these 
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responsible for the nooses were lightly punished by the school and 
were not charged with a crime because their conduct violated no state 
law.29  Racial tensions began to build in the town after residents found 
the nooses, eventually leading to an incident in which six black stu-
dents beat a white student unconscious.  Police arrested the six stu-
dents responsible for the beating, and initially charged them with at-
tempted second-degree murder.30  Spun as a racially motivated double 
standard, the story began to attract national attention.  On September 
20, 2007, more than ten thousand protesters gathered in Jena in what 
has been called one of the largest civil rights protests since the Civil 
Rights Era of the 1960s.31
After the Jena incident, nooses began to appear in public places 
around the country,32 leading civil rights leaders to call for—and many 
states to consider—statutes that would outlaw the hanging of nooses.33
Spurred by these incidents, several thousand protesters gathered out-
events may have been, it is undeniable that the popularly reported version of events 
sparked a renewed interest in hate crime legislation. 
29 Mitchell, supra note 28.  While it was commonly reported that the white stu-
dents who hung the nooses received only a three-day suspension, Franklin contends 
that in fact their punishment involved nine days at an alternative facility, two weeks of 
in-school suspension, Saturday detentions, attendance at Discipline Court, and evalua-
tion by mental health professionals.  Franklin, supra note 28. 
30 Mitchell, supra note 28. 
31 Theo Milonopoulos, Sharpton Leads Call for Federal Investigation of Hate Crimes,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at A12; see also Susan Roesga et al., Thousands ‘March for Justice’ 
in Jena, Court Orders Hearing on Teen, CNN.COM, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2007/US/law/09/20/jena.six/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (describing the 
protest and noting the involvement of people from across the country). 
32 See Mark Potok et al., Op-Ed., The Geography of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 
11 (“In the past decade or so, only about a dozen noose incidents a year came to the 
attention of civil rights groups.  But since the huge Sept. 20 rally in Jena, La., where 
tens of thousands protested what they saw as racism in the prosecution of six black 
youths known as the ‘Jena 6,’ this country has seen a rash of as many as 50 to 60 noose 
incidents.”); Jake Wagman, Noose’s Revival is Raising the Issue of Intent, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate 
crimes nationwide, finds fewer than a dozen noose reports in a typical year.  But in the 
last four months, the center says, there have been between 60 and 70, including inci-
dents at a Home Depot in New Jersey, a factory in Houston and at Columbia University 
in New York, where a noose was found hanging on the door of an African-American 
professor’s office.”). 
33 See Jaime Malarkey, Lawmakers:  Include Nooses as Hate-Crime Symbols, EXAMINER 
(Balt.), Jan. 17, 2008, available at http://www.examiner.com/printa-1163272~ 
Lawmakers:_Include_nooses_as_hate_crime_symbols.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) 
(discussing two bills debated in a Maryland House of Delegates committee meeting 
that would make the hanging of nooses a hate crime); Wagman, supra note 32 (noting 
that Missouri and other states are considering legislation criminalizing nooses in re-
sponse to the Jena incident). 
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side the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., on November 16, 
2007, to demand a stronger federal response to bias-motivated 
crimes.34  Although current federal hate crime proposals35 would only 
affect crimes committed because of bias that “caus[e] bodily injury,”36
the renewed attention that the Jena incident has brought to these pro-
posals has lent strength to the push for their enactment. 
In 2007, federal legislators rode this momentum to the near-
passage of the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 2007 (“Matthew Shepard Act” or “the bill”).37  The 
Matthew Shepard Act would have expanded the classes protected by 
existing civil rights laws and made it easier to exercise federal jurisdic-
tion over bias-motivated violent crimes by relying on the Commerce 
Clause as the source of congressional authority.  Despite generating 
wide support in both houses of Congress, the Matthew Shepard Act 
ultimately failed to become law when President George W. Bush 
promised to veto it if it came before him.  Calling the bill “unneces-
sary and constitutionally questionable,” the Bush Administration 
noted that Congress could only federalize this area of criminal law if it 
did so in implementation of a power granted to it, such as the power 
34 Milonopoulos, supra note 31. 
35 Among these proposals is the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007), which is the statute that is 
the primary subject of this Comment. 
36 In fact, it is likely that if the Matthew Shepard Act were law, the six black stu-
dents in the Jena case would face federal prosecution, but the white students would 
not, because the bill only criminalizes bias-motivated crimes “causing bodily injury.”  S. 
1105 § 7(a)(2)(A).  This highlights a problem with lumping all bias-motivated crimes 
together as hate crimes.  The drafters of the Matthew Shepard Act, facing criticism that 
the bill could implicate serious free speech concerns, specifically inserted language 
denying that any form of speech can amount to a crime under the bill.  See id. § 7(d) 
(refusing to allow evidence of expression or associations of the defendant as substan-
tive evidence unless it is used to establish bias relating to the defendant’s conduct); 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.matthewshepard.org/ 
site/DocServer/HRC-LLEHCPA-FAQ1-17-07.pdf?docID=463 (asserting that the evi-
dentiary rule of § 7(d) addresses concerns that the Matthew Shepard Act could be 
used to prosecute speech).  The House version of the bill also contains a rule of con-
struction that would prevent interpretations of the statute in any way that would “pro-
hibit any expressive conduct protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities pro-
tected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.”  Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 
1592, 110th Cong. § 8.  While the attention the Jena 6 case has brought to hate crimes 
has undoubtedly helped in the campaign to turn the Matthew Shepard Act into law, 
had it been law at the time of the Jena incident, the bill may have actually served to 
exacerbate the situation. 
37 S. 1105; see also H.R. 1592. 
624 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 617
to regulate interstate commerce.38  Without elaborating, the Admini-
stration indicated that the bill did not appear to be properly within 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause or any other 
granted power.39
In response, a number of supporters of the Matthew Shepard Act 
have argued for the bill’s constitutionality.  In so doing, they have 
claimed that because the bill contains a jurisdictional element40 it will 
survive analysis under the Lopez framework and will therefore be a 
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.41
While the Supreme Court has made clear that the presence of a juris-
dictional element that ensures that federal authorities can only prose-
cute cases having a substantial effect on interstate commerce would 
support the bill’s constitutionality, none of the arguments in favor of 
the bill has provided a detailed analysis of its constitutionality under 
Lopez.42  Rather than analyzing the bill’s jurisdictional element to de-
38 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT 
OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1592—LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES 
PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
legislative/sap/110-1/hr1592sap-h.pdf. 
39 Id.
40 A jurisdictional element is “a fact included in a statute that must be pled and 
proven by the plaintiff in each case, serving as a nexus between a particular piece of 
legislation and Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation and to regulate 
the conduct at issue.”  Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV.
643, 679 (2005).  Jurisdictional elements in statutes enacted under the Commerce 
Clause therefore seek to limit the application of the statute to those cases that have a 
nexus to interstate commerce.  See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the 
Wake of Raich:  On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105-06 (2006) (“In a Commerce Clause context, the jurisdictional 
hook requires that the regulated activity or object have a nexus to interstate com-
merce.”).  In the context of a federal criminal law, such as the Matthew Shepard Act, 
the jurisdictional element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the fed-
eral government can claim to have jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id.
41 See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HATE CRIMES: SKETCH OF SE-
LECTED PROPOSALS AND CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 4 (2002), available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/CRS.hate1.pdf (indicating optimism for the 
prospects of Court approval of an earlier version of the Matthew Shepard Act because 
it contained the jurisdictional element present in current versions); Anthony E. Va-
rona & Kevin Layton, Anchoring Justice:  The Constitutionality of the Local Law Enforcement 
Enhancement Act in United States v. Morrison’s Shifting Seas, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 
14 (2001) (“[The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act’s] multiple jurisdictional 
elements ensure that the legislation allows Congress to address the national problem of 
hate-motivated crimes while still fitting into the Court’s Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, as well as the Court’s increasingly conservative view of congressional authority.”). 
42 Generally, the debate surrounding the Matthew Shepard Act is limited to a 
claim by opponents that Morrison prevents Congress from criminalizing violent crime 
that does not cross state lines, and a response by supporters that the bill is constitu-
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termine if it sufficiently limits the range of federal jurisdiction to en-
sure that each crime substantially affects interstate commerce, these 
commentators generally mention in passing that the bill would be 
constitutional simply because it contains a jurisdictional element.43
This is not surprising, given that there is currently no Supreme 
Court case directly addressing the issues of whether the mere pres-
ence of a jurisdictional element will enable a statute to survive scrutiny 
under the Commerce Clause, and, if not, how limiting the element 
must be in order for the statute to survive.  In fact, a comprehensive 
treatment of jurisdictional elements is the only piece of Lopez’s frame-
work that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed.  Lopez identified 
three factors to consider when determining whether a congressional 
statute regulating non-economic activity that is said to substantially af-
fect interstate commerce is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause:  (1) whether the statute contains a jurisdic-
tional element that would limit the class of cases to those substantially 
affecting interstate commerce; (2) whether the statute contains any 
findings showing the regulated activity’s connection to interstate 
commerce; and (3) whether the regulated activity is a necessary piece 
of a larger regulation of economic activity.44  Building on the founda-
tion of Lopez, the Court addressed the sufficiency of congressional 
findings in Morrison and the effect of a greater regulation of economic 
activity in Raich.  To this point, the Court has not taken the opportu-
nity to address the characteristics of a valid jurisdictional element. 
The Supreme Court may soon be presented with such an oppor-
tunity in the form of the Matthew Shepard Act.  With the increasing 
attention drawn by hate crimes nationally, and the success of recent 
votes on proposed hate crime legislation, passage of a federal hate 
crime law within the next few years seems probable, particularly in 
light of the recent election of Barack Obama as President of the 
tional because, unlike the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of Morrison, the Mat-
thew Shepard Act contains a jurisdictional element.  For a good example of this de-
bate, see Markup of H.R. 1592 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 57, 185-
86 (2007). 
43 See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 41 (predicting that the bill will survive a Commerce 
Clause challenge because its jurisdictional element precludes conviction unless the ac-
tivity has the requisite nexus to interstate commerce); Varona & Layton, supra note 41, 
at 12-14 (asserting that the jurisdictional element and the case-by-case analysis it de-
mands will “ensure” that the legislation falls within the commerce power). 
44 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (explaining the fac-
tors that the Court considered in its Lopez decision). 
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United States.45  If this new federal criminal law passes, it will be on a 
direct collision course with the federalism principles announced in 
Lopez.  Ultimately the United States Supreme Court must resolve this 
tension, and the constitutionality of the law that reaches the Court will 
turn on the effectiveness of its jurisdictional element.  What is needed 
now is what no one has yet provided:  a detailed analysis of the Mat-
thew Shepard Act’s jurisdictional element. 
This Comment provides such an analysis of the Matthew Shepard 
Act and closely examines its jurisdictional element to determine 
whether, if passed, the bill would withstand a constitutional challenge 
under the Commerce Clause using Lopez’s framework.  Part I offers a 
brief history of hate crime legislation and describes the relevant provi-
sions of the Matthew Shepard Act.  Part II details modern Commerce 
Clause doctrine as reflected in Lopez and the two major decisions 
since: United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich.  Part III analyzes 
the Matthew Shepard Act under the Lopez framework and concludes 
that if the bill is to be a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, it must be because the bill’s jurisdictional element 
effectively limits the class of cases covered to those that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.  Part IV engages in a detailed analysis of 
that jurisdictional element, determining that the element is too broad 
to allow the bill to withstand constitutional challenge.  Part V argues 
that Congress should abandon its attempt to federalize hate crime 
laws because a version of the Matthew Shepard Act amended to en-
sure its constitutionality would add very little to the protections al-
ready available under state law.  The Comment concludes by predict-
ing that if Congress passes the current version of the bill, the effect of 
45 President-elect Obama has repeatedly expressed his support for the Matthew 
Shepard Act. See Barack Obama and Joe Biden:  The Change We Need, Civil Rights, 
http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/civil_rights/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) 
(“Obama and Biden will strengthen federal hate crimes legislation, expand hate 
crimes protection by passing the Matthew Shepard Act, and reinvigorate enforcement 
at the Department of Justice’s Criminal Section.”); Open Letter from Barack Obama, 
United States Senator and Candidate for President of the United States, to the LGBT 
Community (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://obama.3cdn.net/36ddd2f5daac41cb21 
_rym6bxaax.pdf (“[A]s President, I will place the weight of my administration behind 
the enactment of the Matthew Shepard Act to outlaw hate crimes . . . .”).  In fact, in 
2007, while he was in the United States Senate, President-elect Obama voted to pass 
the Matthew Shepard Act.  See 153 CONG. REC. S12,205 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2007).  As of 
now, the only thing preventing the Matthew Shepard Act from becoming law is Presi-
dent Bush’s threatened veto, so, if President-elect Obama continues to support federal 
hate crime legislation and removes that veto threat, a new federal hate crimes law 
should soon follow. 
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its collision with Lopez will be a landmark case that rounds out the 
Court’s modern Commerce Clause doctrine by clarifying the effect of 
jurisdictional elements in federal statutes. 
I. FEDERAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 created the existing federal criminal 
laws regulating bias crimes.46  To maintain a prosecution under the 
current law, the government must prove two elements:  First, the de-
fendant must have committed the crime because of the victim’s race, 
religion, national origin, or color.47  Second, the defendant must have 
intended to prevent the victim from exercising a federally protected 
right such as voting or attending a public school.48  Although this law 
provides for some federal involvement in the prosecution of hate 
crimes, the federally-protected-activity requirement seriously limits 
this potential.49  For instance, the murder of neither James Byrd, Jr., 
nor Matthew Shepard could be prosecuted under federal law because 
neither victim was engaged in a federally protected activity.50  The 
Matthew Shepard Act would expand the protected classes to include 
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability,51 and would 
eliminate the federally-protected-activity requirement.52
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2006) (making it unlawful to injure, intimidate, or 
interfere with any person because he is engaging in a federally protected activity be-
cause of his “race, color, religion, or national origin”). 
47 Id.
48 The activities protected include (1) attending a public school, (2) receiving a 
benefit or using a facility administered by a State, (3) applying for employment, (4) 
serving as a juror, (5) using a common carrier for transportation, and (6) staying at a 
hotel or eating at a restaurant.  Id.
49 See Varona & Layton, supra note 41, at 10 (highlighting the substantial barrier to 
successful prosecution that is erected by the requirement that the perpetrator “must 
have intended to prevent the victim from exercising a federally protected right” (em-
phasis added)). 
50 Although federal charges could not be brought, both sets of defendants were 
convicted under state law for the murders.  John King and Lawrence Brewer were both 
sentenced to death, and Shawn Berry was sentenced to life in prison, for the murder of 
James Byrd, Jr.  In addition, Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney were both given 
consecutive life sentences for the murder of Matthew Shepard.  See infra note 82. 
51 S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(4) (2007). 
52 Compare id. § 7 with 18 U.S.C. § 245. 
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A.  History of the Matthew Shepard Act 
The Matthew Shepard Act is the most recent in a long line of pro-
posals attempting to expand federal jurisdiction over bias-motivated 
crimes.  In the 1990s, many of these proposals involved the collecting 
and reporting of hate crime statistics.53  The first bill attempting to 
expand the classes covered by existing federal bias-crime statutes and 
remove the federally-protected-activity requirement was the Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 1997,54 introduced by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy in the 105th Congress.55  Since that time, Senator Kennedy has 
introduced a bill in each Congress that is substantially similar to the 
Matthew Shepard Act and that would create federal jurisdiction over 
bias-motivated crimes.56
As noted above, the highly publicized murders of James Byrd, Jr., 
and Matthew Shepard in 1998 generated considerable momentum for 
federal hate crime legislation.  The bill came close to passing in the 
wake of the publicity generated by these crimes when the Senate ap-
proved it as an amendment to the 2001 defense appropriations bill.57
The House version of the defense bill, however, did not contain the 
amendment, and eventually the House version prevailed in commit-
tee.  After this near victory, federal hate crime legislation, although 
introduced by Senator Kennedy in each Congress, did not again come 
close to passing into law until 2007. 
53 Congress has sought to increase the awareness of bias-motivated crime since 
1990.  In that year, the Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 
(1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (2006)), was passed, which requires the At-
torney General to collect and publish data on crimes committed because of the vic-
tim’s race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.  In 1994, Congress 
passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note), requiring the 
United States Sentencing Commission to increase the penalty for defendants who se-
lected their victims based on the victim’s race, color, religion, national origin, ethnic-
ity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation.  In 1998, Congress passed the Campus 
Hate Crimes Right to Know Act, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 486, 112 Stat. 1581, 1743 
(1998) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(ii) (2006)), requiring campus security 
officers to collect and report data on crimes committed based on the victim’s race, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or disability. 
54 S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997). 
55 It was this bill that President Clinton urged Congress to pass the next year follow-
ing the murders of James Byrd, Jr., and Matthew Shepard.  See Crowder, supra note 24. 
56 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE LOCAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT 1 (2007), available at http:// 
www.matthewshepard.org/site/DocServer/HRC-LLEHCPA-FAQ1-1707.pdf?docID=463. 
57 S. 2550, 106th Cong. tit. XV (2000). 
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In 2007, with the election of a Democratic majority in Congress 
and the publicity generated by the Jena incident, federal hate crime 
legislation again came to national attention.  On May 3, 2007, the 
House passed its own version of the Matthew Shepard Act—the Local 
Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007.58  On the same 
day, President Bush responded by threatening to veto the bill if it 
came to him, claiming that the bill was “unnecessary and constitution-
ally questionable.”59  Fearing a presidential veto, the Senate approved 
the bill as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 200860 on September 27, 2007.61  After being sent to 
committee for reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the 
defense bill, the Matthew Shepard Act amendment was removed be-
cause of a sense that together the two controversial bills could not 
generate the necessary support.62  House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has 
said that she still is committed to passing a federal hate crime prohibi-
tion,63 so the issue is likely to reappear in the near future.  Given the 
results of the 2008 presidential and congressional elections, a federal 
hate crime statute could soon become a reality.
58 H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007). 
59 STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, supra note 38. 
60 H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. (2007). 
61 See 120 CONG. REC. S12071 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2007).  Although the bill could 
have passed the Senate on its own, the bill’s supporters thought that it would be more 
difficult for the President to veto the defense authorization bill, particularly because it 
contained politically popular pay increases for soldiers.  See S.A. Miller, Gay Protection 
Tacked onto Defense Bill; Bush’s Veto Would Be First in U.S. History, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2007, at A1.  If the bill had been passed and vetoed, it is unlikely that the bill’s sup-
porters could have gathered enough votes to override the veto.  See Rick Klein, Gay-
Rights Proposals Gain in Congress:  Measures Would Add Protections, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
25, 2007, at A1 (“Democratic leaders say that while they have enough votes to approve 
[hate crime legislation], they probably could not override a presidential veto.”). 
62 See Editorial, Caving in on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22 (claim-
ing that a majority supporting the combined bills could not be reached because “some 
liberals did not want to vote for the defense bill and some conservatives did not want to 
vote for the hate crimes bill”). 
63 See Press Release, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Hate Crimes 
Legislation (Dec. 6, 2007), http://speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=0432 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2008) (stating that Pelosi is “strongly committed to sending the hate 
crimes legislation, passed by the House [in 2007], to the President for his signature” 
and that “House Democratic leaders will work with [their] Senate colleagues to make 
certain that a hate crime bill passes the Senate and goes to the President’s desk”). 
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B.  Structure of the Matthew Shepard Act 
The Matthew Shepard Act is broken into two sections.  Section 
7(a)(1) includes the same classes as the Civil Rights Act (race, relig-
ion, and national origin), but does away with the federally-protected-
activity requirement.64  In removing this requirement, the bill cites the 
Thirteenth Amendment as the source of congressional authority over 
crimes motivated by bias against these classes.65  The claim is that be-
cause the Supreme Court has interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment 
to authorize Congress to “[abolish] all the badges and incidents of 
slavery” even by restraining private actors, Congress may therefore use 
this authority to prohibit bias-motivated crimes based on race, relig-
ion, and national origin.66  Some commentators have presented ar-
guments suggesting problems with relying on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to authorize a federal hate crime law,67 but the inquiry here is 
more concerned with the second section of the bill, which contains 
the jurisdictional element. 
Along with removing the federally-protected-activity requirement, 
section 7(a)(2) adds gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability 
to the list of protected classes.  Because these classifications never 
were a means for promoting slavery, the protection of these classes 
64 S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(1) (2007). 
65 Id. § 2(7)–(8).  The Supreme Court has held that the Thirteenth Amendment 
authorizes Congress to enact laws to eliminate the “badges and incidents of slavery,” 
even by restraining private actors.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-
40 (1968) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers the federal govern-
ment to prohibit racially biased actions of private parties); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“[T]he power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropri-
ate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for 
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States . . . .”).  As the ar-
gument goes, because slavery was racially based, the Thirteenth Amendment author-
izes laws designed to remedy racial discrimination.  In addition, because nationality 
and religion were often used as a proxy for race, one may argue that the Thirteenth 
Amendment can be used to prevent discrimination based on these classifications as 
well. See Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 1009-10 (discussing arguments for and against 
the use of the Thirteenth Amendment to support a federal hate crime law). 
66 Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-40. 
67 See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against 
Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1220-21 (2000) (arguing both that 
even if a hate crime law could be supported by the Thirteenth Amendment, it would 
still be constitutionally problematic under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and that the Supreme Court would avoid approving a bill that puts two constitu-
tional amendments in conflict); Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 1009-10 (observing that 
the doctrine surrounding the Thirteenth Amendment is not well developed and not-
ing the differences between race and religion as well as civil and criminal statutes). 
2008] Jurisdictional Analysis of Federal Hate Crime Laws 631
cannot be based on “removing the badges and incidents of slavery,” 
and the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be used as the source of fed-
eral power to enact the bill.  Because the Thirteenth Amendment 
cannot support the bill, its drafters have sought to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause as a way to eliminate the federally-protected-activity 
requirement. 
To support the bill’s constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause, its authors included findings attempting to show how bias-
motivated crimes affect interstate commerce.  The bill states the fol-
lowing:
Such violence substantially affects interstate commerce in many ways, in-
cluding the following: 
 (A) The movement of members of targeted groups is impeded, and 
members of such groups are forced to move across State lines to escape 
the incidence and risk of such violence. 
 (B) Members of targeted groups are prevented from purchasing 
goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating 
in other commercial activity. 
 (C) Perpetrators cross State lines to commit such violence. 
 (D) Channels, facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
are used to facilitate the commission of such violence. 
 (E) Such violence is committed using articles that have traveled in in-
terstate commerce.
68
In addition to findings that support the connection between bias-
motivated crimes and interstate commerce, the bill also includes a ju-
risdictional element, which attempts to ensure that only situations 
where the crime substantially affects interstate commerce trigger fed-
eral jurisdiction.  The bill’s jurisdictional element contains multiple 
prongs through which federal prosecutors can establish the necessary 
connection to interstate commerce. First, the text of the bill triggers 
federal jurisdiction when the victim or defendant commits the crime 
after traveling across state lines.69  Second, jurisdiction is triggered 
whenever the defendant uses a “channel, facility, or instrumentality of 
interstate or foreign commerce” in connection with the crime.70
Third, federal prosecutors may establish jurisdiction by proving that 
any weapon used by the defendant passed through interstate com-
68 S. 1105 § 2(6). 
69 Id. § 7(a) (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
70 Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(ii)). 
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merce at some point.71  Next, federal jurisdiction will be appropriate 
when prosecutors can establish that a bias-motivated crime of violence 
interferes with economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the 
time of the offense.72  Finally, federal jurisdiction will be appropriate if 
the prosecutors can somehow establish that the crime “otherwise af-
fects interstate . . . commerce.”73
C.  Debate Surrounding the Matthew Shepard Act 
The Matthew Shepard Act has drawn criticism from an exception-
ally wide range of sources.  Even the basic question of whether hate 
crimes should be subject to enhanced penalties is extremely contro-
versial and generates significant debate in state legislatures across the 
country.74  The Matthew Shepard Act, however, is more controversial 
than standard state hate crime statutes for two reasons.  First, because 
the Matthew Shepard Act would add sexual orientation and gender 
71 Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iii)). 
72 Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)). 
73 Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II)).  This language sig-
nifies Congress’s intent to exercise the full authority of the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000) (holding that the language “any activ-
ity affecting . . . commerce” demonstrates Congress’s intent to invoke its full authority 
under the Commerce Clause); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 
(1963) (establishing that the words “affecting commerce” indicate Congress’s inten-
tion to exercise jurisdiction to the full limits of the Commerce Clause). 
74 See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY 
POLITICS 29, 29-44 (1998), as reprinted in ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 839-48 (describ-
ing the differences that exist among the states regarding the punishment of bias-
motivated crimes).  Supporters of heavier punishments for bias-motivated crimes claim 
that these crimes are more harmful to both the individual and society than an equiva-
lent crime that is not motivated by bias.  In fact, in upholding a state’s imposition of 
extra punishments for crimes motivated by bias, the Supreme Court identified three 
ways in which these crimes create greater harms than their non-bias-motivated coun-
terparts:  “[B]ias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict 
distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.”  Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993).  Opponents of enhanced punishments for hate 
crimes note the imprecision in any measure of a defendant’s motivation for commit-
ting a crime and argue that in any given case it is extremely difficult to identify exactly 
what a defendant’s motivation may have been.  See Baker, supra note 67, at 1209-11.  
Conditioning a defendant’s sentence on a factual question that is extremely difficult to 
conclusively determine contravenes the legality principle, which requires criminal laws 
to be both clear and determinate.  See id. at 1213-14.  In addition, opponents argue 
that it is the underlying offense that causes harm to the victim, not the mental state of 
the perpetrator.  See id. at 1215 (“The concept of ‘hate’ as harm, however, actually has 
little, if anything, to do with the harm to particular victims.”).  To condition punish-
ment on the beliefs of the perpetrator may lead to different punishment for the same 
harmful conduct.  See id. at 1211-12. 
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identity to the existing federal bias-crime laws as protected classes, 
many see this bill as an effort to give special protections to those 
classes.75  Second, because the bill would eliminate the federally-
protected-activity requirement and create federal jurisdiction over a 
much broader area of criminal conduct traditionally left to the states, 
many opponents see it as an intrusion into the residual state sover-
eignty guaranteed by the federal system established by the Constitu-
tion.76
Noting that the protection of citizens through the police power is 
one of the core areas of traditional state concern,77 those who object 
to the bill on federalism grounds make a number of arguments 
against federal hate crime laws.  First, some have argued that federal 
criminal law introduces complexities into the administration of justice 
that otherwise do not exist under state law and therefore makes the 
criminal justice system less effective.78  For example, because of the 
constitutionally mandated jurisdictional elements present in most 
federal criminal statutes, a prosecution under federal law is often 
much more complex than the same prosecution at the state level.  In 
addition, fair prosecution is more difficult because federal officials are 
often far removed from local conditions, which may be particularly 
relevant in the context of a hate crime case because societal percep-
tions play such a key role in evaluating the existence of bias motiva-
tion.  This complexity increases the costs of the prosecution and often 
makes it more difficult to convict a defendant of a federal offense. 
In addition to the complexities introduced by a federal prosecu-
tion, many opponents of federal hate crime legislation assert that fed-
75 See, e.g., Peter Sprigg, Op-Ed., Reject the ‘Hate Crimes’ Bill; The Mythology Behind 
Matthew Shepard, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A19 (drawing a parallel between the 
murder of Matthew Shepard and that of Cindy Dixon, the mother of one of Shepard’s 
killers, and arguing that the Matthew Shepard Act would entitle Shepard to greater 
protection under federal law than it would Dixon). 
76 Cf., e.g., Baker, supra note 67, at 1215-21 (arguing that any federal hate crime 
statute passed by Congress will most likely face significant challenges in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison).
77 Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (“The regulation and 
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, chan-
nels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the 
States. . . . Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the sup-
pression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”). 
78 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 67, at 1194-99 (arguing that state prosecutions are 
preferable to federal prosecutions because of the increased complexity involved with 
federal cases). 
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eral prosecution is unnecessary because most states have laws that 
adequately cover the underlying offense and provide enhanced penal-
ties for bias motivation.79  In fact, the Statement of Administration Pol-
icy issued by the executive branch after passage of the House version 
of the Matthew Shepard Act in 2007 expresses the President’s position 
that the Matthew Shepard Act is “unnecessary.”80  In so doing, the 
statement argues that 
[t]here has been no persuasive demonstration of any need to federalize 
such a potentially large range of violent crime enforcement, and doing 
so is inconsistent with the proper allocation of criminal enforcement re-
sponsibilities between the different levels of government.  In addition, 
almost every State in the country can actively prosecute hate crimes un-
der the State’s own hate crimes law.
81
Importantly, despite the push to enact federal hate crime laws that 
grew out of the murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., all 
of the defendants in these two cases were convicted in state court and 
sentenced to either life in prison or death without the assistance of a 
federal law.82
Finally, many argue that congressional support for federal hate 
crime laws comes more from a desire by members to express disgust 
for bigoted attitudes than from any perceived problem in state crimi-
nal justice systems.83  In making this argument, commentators note 
that many of the federal criminal laws passed in recent years have 
79 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 38. 
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney both pled guilty to kidnapping and 
murder charges and received two consecutive life sentences for the murder of Matthew 
Shepard.  Tiffany Edwards, Gay Man’s Murderer Sentenced to Life, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 5, 
1999, at A24; Man Gets 2 Life Terms in Gay Student’s Death; Defendant Pleaded Guilty in 
Wyoming Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 6, 1999, at A2.  In giving him that sentence, the 
state judge told Henderson that he “deserv[ed] the fullest punishment [the] court can 
mete out.”  Id.  John William King and Lawrence Russell Brewer both received death 
sentences for the murder of James Byrd, Jr.  Lee Hancock, Racist to Die For Killing; Vic-
tim’s Kin Hail Sentence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1A.  Shawn Allen 
Berry was given a life sentence for his part in the Byrd murder.  Patty Reinert & Rich-
ard Stewart, 3rd Defendant Gets Life Sentence in Jasper Man’s Dragging Death, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Nov. 19, 1999, at 1A.  The families and communities of the victims indicated 
that they were satisfied with the punishments in both of these cases.  See Edwards, supra
(quoting Matthew Shepard’s father as praising the jury for its guilty verdicts in Aaron 
McKinney’s case); Charisse Jones, Sentence Sits Well With Texas Town, USA TODAY, Feb. 
26, 1999, at 3A (reporting that after learning of King’s death sentence, “no one [in Jas-
per, Texas] disagreed that justice had been done”).
83 See Baker, supra note 67, at 1214. 
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gone largely unprosecuted.84  In fact, because criminal prosecutions 
under the Federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)85 were so 
rare, the case in which the Supreme Court ultimately declared the law 
unconstitutional came in the context of a civil action for damages.86
Prosecutions under the Matthew Shepard Act will likely be similarly 
rare, leading some opponents to conclude that Congress is more con-
cerned with winning the favor of voters or sending a symbolic message 
than with remedying a problem of state prosecutions.87  Regardless of 
its source, the bipartisan support that the Matthew Shepard Act has 
received in Congress indicates that federal legislators will most likely 
pass the bill in the near future.  The intense and widespread criticism 
generated by the Matthew Shepard Act ensures that once it is passed, 
those representing individuals prosecuted under it will be prepared to 
challenge the bill’s constitutionality. 
II. MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
One of the major constitutional challenges to the Matthew 
Shepard Act will be that it exceeds Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  Whether or not the bill is within Congress’s power 
to regulate interstate commerce is a question that must be analyzed 
within the framework announced in the Supreme Court’s 1995 deci-
sion in United States v. Lopez. Lopez set out a general framework for 
evaluating Commerce Clause cases, and reinterpreted the Court’s past 
cases to fit within this framework.  Because the Court’s subsequent de-
cisions in United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich indicate that 
future Commerce Clause cases will continue to be decided within Lo-
pez’s framework, this Comment does not attempt to give a detailed 
presentation of the doctrine’s historical development.88  Instead, this 
84 See id. at 1215 (claiming that many recently enacted federal criminal laws go un-
prosecuted because the federal court system could not handle the consistent enforce-
ment of these laws due to the volume of federal criminal laws passed since the 1970s). 
85  Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
86 Baker, supra note 67, at 1215. 
87 See id.; see also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2028 
(2008) (describing the factors that lead to underprosecution of federal criminal laws 
and arguing that the “optional nature” of these laws makes them “useful vehicles for 
sending symbolic messages”). 
88 For a good general description of the history of Commerce Clause doctrine, see 
Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez:  A Survey, 32 
CAP. U. L. REV. 671, 673-89 (2004). 
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Part will discuss the modern doctrine as presented in Lopez and devel-
oped in Morrison and Raich.89
A.  The Lopez Framework 
As explained in Lopez, Congress traditionally has had the power to 
regulate three broad areas under the Commerce Clause:  first, Con-
gress may regulate “the channels of interstate commerce”;90 second, 
Congress may regulate “persons or things in interstate commerce”;91
and third, Congress may regulate activities that “substantially affect in-
terstate commerce.”92  The modern debate over the limits of Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause has centered on this third 
category of regulation, and the primary contribution of Lopez has been 
to provide a framework for determining when an activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce. 
Under Lopez, the Court must perform a two-step inquiry when 
evaluating a law under the substantial-effects test.  First, the Court 
must determine whether the activity regulated is economic activity.  If 
the activity regulated is economic, the Court will be highly deferential 
to Congress’s determination that it substantially affects interstate 
commerce and will most likely uphold the regulation.93  If the Court 
determines that the activity regulated is not economic, the Court will 
be less deferential, considering three factors to determine whether 
the regulation is within congressional power:  (1) whether the statute 
contains a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to activities affect-
ing interstate commerce;94 (2) whether Congress has offered any find-
89 Most discussions of Commerce Clause doctrine treat the subject historically, de-
tailing the original direct-effects test used prior to 1937, the development and refine-
ment of the substantial-effects test from 1937 to United States v. Lopez in 1995, and as-
sessing the changes resulting from Lopez and more recent Commerce Clause cases.  See,
e.g., Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 978-85.  While this is a reasonable approach to take, it 
is not the most helpful in performing an analysis under the Commerce Clause.  Be-
cause Lopez reinterpreted without overruling any particular case, the Court’s past cases 
have the meaning that Lopez ascribes to them rather than the meaning they originally 
may have carried. 
90 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 559. 
93 See id. at 560 (“These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is 
clear.  Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”). 
94 See id. at 561 (concluding that the GFSZA contains no such jurisdictional ele-
ment); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (noting that the 
Violence Against Women Act contains no jurisdictional element). 
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ings showing the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce;95
and (3) whether the statute is a necessary part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity.96
In two cases decided after Lopez—United States v. Morrison and Gon-
zales v. Raich—the Supreme Court expanded on its analysis of the sec-
ond and third of these factors.  In Morrison the Court discussed the 
impact that congressional findings have on a statute’s constitutional-
ity,97 and in Raich the Court identified a situation where a law could be 
considered part of a larger regulation of economic activity.98  The 
Court has not yet taken the opportunity to decide a case clarifying the 
impact that a jurisdictional element would have on a statute’s consti-
tutionality, but, as we will see below, the Matthew Shepard Act, if 
passed, could give the Court an excellent opportunity to expand on 
the doctrine in this area.  For now, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich each add 
to, and build upon, the Supreme Court’s new Commerce Clause doc-
trine and therefore deserve separate attention.
B. United States v. Lopez
Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a 
federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a 
school zone.”99  In striking down the regulation, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, noted 
that “if § 922(q) [were] to be sustained, it must be under the third 
category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects inter-
95 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (observing that Congress, in support of VAWA, 
made “numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence 
has on victims and their families”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (noting the absence of 
congressional findings regarding the effects of gun possession in a school zone on in-
terstate commerce). 
96 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2005) (distinguishing the Controlled 
Substances Act, part of a broad regulatory scheme, from the more narrow statutes at 
issue in Lopez and Morrison); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (designating the GFSZA as a crimi-
nal statute not part of a comprehensive regulation of economic activity); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (explaining that the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938 serves a wide and important regulatory function). 
97 529 U.S. at 614-15; see also infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text. 
98 545 U.S. at 23-25; see also infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. 
99 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, amended by
Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 
3009-314, 3009-369 to -370 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006)). 
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state commerce.”100  After introducing its new framework for analyzing 
substantial-effects-test cases,101 the Court found that the statute con-
tained no jurisdictional element that would limit its scope, included 
no congressional findings showing its connection to interstate com-
merce, and was not an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity.102  Also significant to the Court was the fact that the 
GFSZA tended to create a federal police power over areas traditionally 
subject only to state control.103  Because § 922(q) regulated non-
economic activity, the Court declared it to be outside of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause when examined in light of the 
three factors.104
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
O’Connor.  Although he counseled that the Court must show “great 
restraint” before declaring an act of Congress invalid under the 
Commerce Clause,105 Justice Kennedy indicated that he voted to over-
turn the law because Congress had intruded into an area of regulation 
traditionally controlled by the states.106  He argued that when Con-
gress attempts to regulate conduct that has only an attenuated effect 
on interstate commerce, the Court should “inquire whether the exer-
cise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional 
state concern.”107  Allowing the federal government to control public-
school grounds would prevent states from acting as “laboratories for 
experimentation” in order to test new policy choices.108  Even so, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurrence indicated that he was willing to allow sig-
nificant intrusions on state sovereignty, but not without a closer link to 
commerce.109  Also concurring, Justice Thomas expressed his opinion 
that the substantial-effects test has no basis in the Constitution and 
could lead to a federal police power over all areas of life.110   
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer all authored dissenting opin-
ions, expressing their belief that the majority opinion significantly de-
100 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96. 
102 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63. 
103 See id. at 561 n.3 (emphasizing that the states hold primary authority over 
criminal law enforcement). 
104 Id. at 559-63. 
105 Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
106 Id. at 580. 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 581. 
109 Id. at 583. 
110 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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parted from the Court’s prior Commerce Clause doctrine.  Justice 
Souter argued that, under the Court’s prior holdings, Congress 
should receive great deference, and that the Court should uphold 
laws enacted under the Commerce Clause as long as Congress had a 
rational basis for finding that the regulated activity affected interstate 
commerce.111  Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, agreed, and attempted to show that the GFSZA 
passed rational basis review because guns affect education, and the 
quality of the education that children receive will determine future 
American economic success.112  Justice Stevens wrote separately to ex-
press his agreement with Justices Souter and Breyer, and to argue that 
because Congress has the power to eliminate the market for guns 
generally, it also has the power to eliminate that market among 
school-age children.113
Dissenting opinions notwithstanding, the Court in Lopez voted, 
five to four, to strike down a law enacted under the Commerce Clause 
for the first time in nearly sixty years.  In so doing, it set out a new 
framework for analyzing substantial-effects-test cases and identified 
three factors to consider when determining whether a law actually 
regulates an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.  Al-
though it developed this framework, Lopez did not provide much 
guidance as to how the factors should be weighed in any given situa-
tion because the GFSZA satisfied none of the three factors.  The Court 
left to future cases the task of defining the extent to which each of the 
three factors would weigh in favor of, or against, upholding a chal-
lenged law. 
C. United States v. Morrison
The next major development in the Supreme Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence came in 2000, with United States v. Morrison. Mor-
rison involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision of 
VAWA,  which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence.114  As in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered 
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas joined.  In order to satisfy the threshold inquiry of 
111 Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 619-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
114 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1914 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 13981 (Supp. V 2005)). 
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Lopez, the Court first established that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of 
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”115  Be-
cause VAWA did not involve economic activity, the Court turned to 
Lopez’s three factors to determine whether the law actually regulated 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Like the GFSZA, VAWA contained no jurisdictional element limit-
ing its reach and was clearly not a necessary piece of any larger regula-
tion of economic activity.116  The statute, however, did contain exten-
sive findings about the impact of gender-motivated violence on 
interstate commerce.117  Congress found that gender-motivated vio-
lence affects interstate commerce “by deterring potential victims from 
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate busi-
ness, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in in-
terstate commerce . . . [as well as] by diminishing national productiv-
ity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of 
and the demand for interstate products.”118
The first question raised by these findings was whether their mere 
presence—the simple fact that Congress listed findings showing a 
connection to interstate commerce—would be enough to satisfy Lopez.
In answering this question, the Supreme Court first established that 
whether an activity affects interstate commerce substantially enough 
to give Congress the power to regulate it is a judicial, rather than a 
legislative, question.119  Consequently, Congress’s findings that an ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce are not sufficient, by 
themselves, to sustain a law enacted under the Commerce Clause.120
The first lesson of Morrison is, therefore, that the Lopez factors are not 
a “drafting guide” for laws enacted under the Commerce Clause.121  In 
other words, it is not the fact that Congress has included findings that 
115 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
116 Id.
117 Id. at 614. 
118 Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853); accord S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (“Gender-
based crime[] . . . restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases 
health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate 
commerce and the national economy.”).
119 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (“[W]hether particular operations affect interstate 
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate 
them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally 
only by this Court.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964))). 
120 Id.
121 Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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will weigh in favor of upholding the law, but rather the extent to 
which, in the Court’s judgment, the activity actually affects interstate 
commerce.  
Having established that the mere presence of congressional find-
ings would not support VAWA, the Court next moved on to analyze 
the extent to which gender-motivated violence affects interstate com-
merce.  The Court ultimately rejected Congress’s findings, holding 
that the link they established between gender-motivated violent crime 
and interstate commerce was too attenuated to conclude that this type 
of violence substantially affects interstate commerce.122  In so doing, 
the Court expressed its concern that the type of reasoning employed 
by Congress—“follow[ing] the but-for causal chain from the initial oc-
currence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been 
the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect 
upon interstate commerce”123—would allow Congress to use the 
Commerce Clause to destroy “the Constitution’s distinction between 
national and local authority.”124
Thus, the second lesson of Morrison is that the Court will look 
skeptically at regulations that tend to destroy all distinction between 
national and local authority, and thereby give Congress a type of ple-
nary power to legislate.  This is what has been called the “non-infinity 
principle,” which is “the principle that any accepted theory of the 
Commerce Clause resulting in a virtually unlimited source of govern-
mental power must be invalid” because it would “undermine the very 
notion of enumerated powers.”125  The Court seemed to emphasize 
the importance of this principle in Morrison when it rejected Con-
gress’s findings, concluding that if it were to accept Congress’s reason-
ing that an activity’s distant and indirect impact on the economy 
could be a basis for legislation, there would be no reason that Con-
gress could not regulate other types of violent crime, family law, or 
even murder.126 Morrison therefore seems to indicate that whenever 
Congress tries to claim an unlimited power to legislate, particularly in 
122 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17. 
123 Id. at 615. 
124 Id.
125 Reynolds & Denning, supra note 15, at 376-78; see also David B. Kopel & Glenn H. 
Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously:  Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 
CONN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1997) (developing the concept of the “non-infinity principle” and 
defining it as the principle that “for a Commerce Clause rationale to be acceptable under 
Lopez, it must not be a rationale that would allow Congress to legislate on everything”). 
126 529 U.S. at 615-16. 
642 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 617
areas traditionally regulated by the states, the Court will be extremely 
hesitant to uphold the legislation.
D. Gonzales v. Raich
The most recent case involving Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause was the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Gonzales 
v. Raich.  In Raich the Court upheld the portion of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA)127 that prohibited the possession or cultivation 
of marijuana.  The plaintiffs sought to prevent enforcement of the 
CSA’s restrictions against their use of marijuana for medicinal pur-
poses, which California law permitted.128  While the CSA contained no 
jurisdictional restriction or congressional findings dealing with mari-
juana use for medicinal purposes, the Court upheld its ban because 
allowing medicinal marijuana use could undercut the CSA’s effective-
ness.129  The Court applied the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Fil-
burn,130 finding that Congress could have rationally believed that the 
prohibition against medical marijuana was an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity.131  In so doing, the Court expanded 
on Lopez’s third factor, and provided some explanation about when a 
regulation will be upheld as being necessary to a larger economic 
regulation. 
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Jus-
tices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  For Justice Ste-
vens, the central question was whether Congress had a rational basis 
for concluding that this regulation was an essential part of a larger 
regulatory scheme.132  Because Congress could have rationally con-
cluded that the allowance of intrastate drug use would hinder its abil-
ity to eliminate the interstate drug market, the Court upheld Con-
gress’s action.133
127 Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202, 84 Stat. 1242, 1249 (1970) (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006)). 
128 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005). 
129 Id. at 26-27. 
130 See 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to the de-
mand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of 
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many 
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”). 
131 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19. 
132 Id. at 26. 
133 Id.
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It is important to note the subtle difference between the rational 
basis review of Raich and the rational basis review applied in past Com-
merce Clause cases such as Katzenbach v. McClung134 and Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States.135 Morrison rejected the claim that for a stat-
ute to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause the Court simply 
had to determine that Congress had a rational basis for believing that 
the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.136  Al-
though seen by some as a return to pre-Lopez rational basis review of 
Commerce Clause cases,137 the Court in Raich applied rational basis re-
view to Congress’s determination that control of intrastate activity was 
necessary to make its larger regulatory scheme effective.  Rather than 
giving Congress carte blanche in the Commerce Clause, this distinc-
tion serves to reinforce Lopez’s claim that the Commerce Clause will in 
fact be a limited grant of authority to Congress because the Court will 
only reach rational basis review after it is satisfied that the larger regu-
latory scheme is valid under the Commerce Clause.  Following Raich,
therefore, the Court must first apply the Lopez framework to the larger 
regulation to determine if it is a valid exercise of Congress’s power un-
der the Commerce Clause.  If the regulatory scheme covers economic 
activity, it will be valid under Lopez and the Court can move on to de-
cide whether the narrower regulation of intrastate activity is necessary.   
In making this subsequent determination, the Court will apply  
rational basis review, and will be deferential to Congress’s decision to  
134 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
135 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
136 Although McClung, 379 U.S. at 304, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-
62, employ this type of rational basis review, it has been rejected by the Court’s mod-
ern cases.  But, in order to maintain the outcomes of these cases, Lopez cites to them as 
representative of decisions upholding statutes regulating economic activity.  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995). 
137 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?  Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) 
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005) (regarding Raich as a repudiation of the 
doctrines espoused in Lopez and Morrison); Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, 
Letter to the Editors, Gonzales v. Raich, the “Comprehensive Scheme” Principle, and the 
Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTL. L. 491, 497 (2005) (suggesting 
that Lopez and Morrison were deviations in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
rather than indications of a federalism revolution); Mollie Lee, Note, Environmental 
Economics:  A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456, 468 
(2006) (“One way to understand Raich is as a retreat from the Court’s new Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, and thus reading Lopez and Morrison as mere aberrations.”).  But
cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case:  A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 884 (2005) (“[I]t is impossible to determine 
whether the majority or the dissent correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison standards, 
because they are so malleable as to justify either result.”). 
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include even intrastate, non-economic activity as long as there is a ra-
tional basis for doing so.  Because the Court will not engage in ra-
tional basis review until after it has applied the Lopez framework to the 
parent regulation, Raich clearly does not signal a return to the pre-
Lopez framework. 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence makes this point clear.  Justice Scalia 
concurred in the judgment, but, unlike the majority, he believed that 
the power to regulate purely intrastate activities that are essential 
pieces of a larger regulation of economic activity derived from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.138  For Justice Scalia, Congress can regu-
late intrastate non-economic activity when it is necessary or proper to 
regulate in order to make effective a larger regulation of interstate 
economic activity.139  The Court must determine “whether the means 
chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end 
under the commerce power.”140  Thus, while Congress could not regu-
late these activities under the Commerce Clause alone, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause allowed Congress to regulate them in order to make 
the CSA effective.  For Justice Scalia, the key question is whether the 
larger statutory scheme is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause 
power to regulate economic activity, and Lopez provides the test for this. 
E.  Themes of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich
It seems that the central message of Lopez, reinforced by Morrison,
is that the Court will once again enforce the outer limits of Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause rather than allowing the 
Clause to serve as the grant of general legislative power that it had be-
come in the previous decades.  As then-Judge Alito noted in a dissent-
ing opinion issued soon after Lopez was decided, “if Lopez means any-
thing, it is that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause must 
have some limits.”141  Consistent with this interpretation, the Court in 
Morrison resisted Congress’s attempt to circumvent the limited grant 
of power that is the Commerce Clause by issuing findings that showed 
only an attenuated connection between gender-motivated violent 
crime and interstate commerce.  Morrison makes clear that Congress 
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves 
part of interstate commerce . . . derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
139 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37. 
140 Id.
141 United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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may not claim the power to regulate everything simply by its use of 
“magic words” that will insulate the statute from constitutional attack.  
It also indicated that the Court will approach with skepticism congres-
sional regulations that have the effect of eliminating any distinction 
between the powers of the federal government and those reserved to 
the states. 
Another recurring theme is the Court’s resistance to allowing 
Congress to regulate areas traditionally controlled by the states.  In 
Lopez the Court expressed concern that the GFSZA encroached on 
both the states’ traditional police powers and their authority to regu-
late education.142  Similarly, in Morrison the Court discussed extensively 
its concern that upholding VAWA could give Congress the power to 
regulate traditional areas of state regulation, such as marriage, di-
vorce, child custody, and every type of violent crime—including mur-
der.143  In fact, one important distinguishing characteristic of the CSA 
in Raich is that because Congress has always had the power to regulate 
controlled substances, upholding the intrastate ban on marijuana, at 
least to the majority, posed no threat to any traditional area of state 
control.144  So, while not specifically presented by Lopez as a factor, all 
three cases make clear that the Court will seek to protect the areas of 
regulation traditionally associated with state control from overreach-
ing by Congress. 
Even after Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, the Court still has not ad-
dressed the first of the Lopez factors:  a situation in which a statute 
must survive or fail on the strength of its jurisdictional element.  Juris-
dictional elements, however, have been a primary tool in Congress’s 
arsenal as it attempts to design statutes that regulate broad areas not 
directly associated with economic activity.  These elements have there-
fore been the subject of some confusion among courts and interest 
among scholars.145  The final piece in the Lopez line of modern Com-
142 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995). 
143 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000). 
144 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 10-15 (discussing the history of the CSA and noting that 
Congress regulated controlled substances as early as 1906). 
145 See Susanna Frederick Fischer, Between Scylla and Charybdis:  The Disagreement 
Among the Federal Circuits over Whether Federal Law Criminalizing the Intrastate Possession of 
Child Pornography Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NEXUS 99, 101-02 (2005) (noting that 
“[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions have placed federal courts of appeals in an impos-
sible situation when ruling on Commerce Clause challenges to [certain types of juris-
dictional elements,]” but that the Supreme Court “has not yet provided clear guidance 
as to the meaning of economic or commercial, nor has it overruled prior precedent 
that seems clearly inconsistent with this limitation”); Stuckey, supra note 40, at 2104-05 
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merce Clause cases would therefore appear to be a case addressing 
the impact and sufficiency of jurisdictional elements.  Once the Court 
addresses this last Lopez factor, the basic contours of the modern 
Commerce Clause framework will be complete.  As will be seen below, 
because of its similarity to VAWA, which was at issue in Morrison, the 
Matthew Shepard Act may provide the Court with the best possible 
opportunity to isolate the effect of a jurisdictional element and bring 
clarity to this area of the law.  An analysis of the Matthew Shepard Act 
under Lopez, then, becomes important not only for the fate of the bill 
itself, but also as a predictor of the Supreme Court’s potential treat-
ment of jurisdictional-element questions more generally. 
III. ANALYSIS UNDER THE LOPEZ FRAMEWORK
At the outset, Morrison indicates that a prohibition against violent 
crime motivated by gender or other characteristics regulates neither 
the channels of interstate commerce nor persons or things in inter-
state commerce.  Therefore, if the Matthew Shepard Act is a valid ex-
ercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause it must be be-
cause bias-motivated crimes have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.146  Because the bill does not regulate economic activity,147
the Court must consider the three Lopez factors:  (1) whether the bill 
contains congressional findings attempting to show the regulated ac-
tivity’s effect on interstate commerce; (2) whether the regulation pro-
vided by the bill is a necessary part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity; and (3) whether the bill contains a jurisdictional element that 
would limit its reach to activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.148
According to Morrison, congressional findings will only support 
the constitutionality of a statute if the connection between the regu-
(describing the confusion courts have faced when analyzing jurisdictional elements after 
Raich and suggesting possible ways in which the courts should deal with these elements). 
146 Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (recounting Lopez’s three-factor analysis and find-
ing that the issue of gender-motivated violence must fall under the substantial-effect 
prong); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (finding that legislation regulating the possession of a 
handgun near schools is neither a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce nor an attempt to regulate the transport of an item through the channels of 
commerce, and that it therefore can only be justified if it has a substantial effect on 
commerce).
147 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (holding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of vio-
lence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”). 
148 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63. 
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lated activity and interstate commerce is not too attenuated.149  In Mor-
rison, the Court noted the presence of congressional findings attempt-
ing to show the connection between gender-motivated violence and 
interstate commerce: 
Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate com-
merce “by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from en-
gaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with 
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce; . . . by diminish-
ing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and de-
creasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.”
150
The Court ultimately rejected Congress’s findings because the reason-
ing it advanced, following “the but-for causal chain from the initial 
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been 
the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect 
upon interstate commerce,” would give Congress unlimited author-
ity.151  As noted above, Morrison reinforced the Court’s resistance to 
any type of “magic words” that could give Congress unlimited author-
ity simply by their inclusion. 
The findings contained within section 2 of the Matthew Shepard 
Act are very similar to those present in VAWA.  Central to Congress’s 
findings in the bill is the claim that hate crimes impede the movement 
of targeted groups and prevent members of such groups from engag-
ing in interstate commerce.152  Because in Morrison the Court held that 
a similar connection between gender-motivated violent crime and in-
terstate commerce was too attenuated to support VAWA, the findings 
present in the Matthew Shepard Act will also likely be insufficient to 
sustain it. 
It is also clear that the Matthew Shepard Act is not a necessary part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity.  Of the three recent Com-
merce Clause cases, only Raich involved a prohibition that was part of 
a larger regulatory framework.  In that case, the prohibition on intra-
state, noncommercial possession of marijuana was necessary because 
the absence of such regulation would undercut the CSA’s attempt to 
eliminate the interstate market in illegal drugs.  However, the Court 
in Morrison held that VAWA was not a necessary part of a larger regu-
149 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. 
150 Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853). 
151 Id.
152 S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 2(6) (2007). 
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lation of economic activity, presumably because there is no interstate 
market for gender-motivated violence.153  Like VAWA, the Matthew 
Shepard Act seeks to claim federal jurisdiction over crimes motivated 
by gender, among other classifications.  Because it held that VAWA 
was not part of a larger regulation of economic activity, the Court will 
likely hold that the Matthew Shepard Act is similarly not part of a lar-
ger regulatory scheme.154
The primary difference between the laws at issue in the three 
modern Commerce Clause cases and the Matthew Shepard Act is the 
presence of a jurisdictional element attempting to limit the reach of 
the bill to conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.  In 
fact, without this jurisdictional element the bill is remarkably similar 
to VAWA, and the Court would most likely declare the law unconstitu-
tional on similar grounds.  The effectiveness of this jurisdictional ele-
ment will therefore likely determine the constitutionality of the bill. 
In fact, because the Matthew Shepard Act is so similar to VAWA—
from its congressional findings to the type of conduct regulated—a 
case challenging the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Act 
would present the Court with an excellent opportunity to clarify the 
Lopez framework with regard to jurisdictional elements.  Since the bill 
is clearly unconstitutional without the jurisdictional element, such a 
case would allow the Court to isolate the effect of the jurisdictional 
element and speak directly to this issue.  Also, because the particular 
jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act contains every type 
of jurisdictional-element prong used by Congress,155 the Court would 
have the opportunity to assess thoroughly the impact of each.  The 
153 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (distinguishing Raich and Morrison
on the ground that the CSA regulated quintessentially economic activity such as “pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption,” while VAWA regulated activity that was more 
criminal than economic). 
154 Interestingly, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Raich expressed con-
cern that the Court’s decision in that case would allow Congress to claim unlimited 
authority by regulating broadly.  Id. at 46-47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  But, the analy-
sis above shows that, at least in the case of intrastate, non-economic, criminal law, Raich
is not the carte blanche that Justice O’Connor feared.  It is true that Congress could 
insert findings stating that jurisdiction over intrastate bias-motivated crimes is neces-
sary for some larger regulatory purpose.  In that case, it becomes especially important 
for the Court to remember the lesson of Lopez and Morrison and continue to enforce 
the limits of the Commerce Clause.  For now, however, the Matthew Shepard Act con-
tains no such findings and is clearly not part of a larger economic regulation. 
155 The particular jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act contains at 
least five independent bases for federal prosecutors to claim jurisdiction.  See S. 1105, 
110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B) (2007).  For a discussion of these provisions, see supra notes 
67-73 and accompanying text. 
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remainder of this Comment will conduct this analysis based on the 
decisions of many of the courts of appeals applying Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL-ELEMENT ANALYSIS
A jurisdictional element exists to limit the reach of a statute to a 
discrete set of activities that “have an explicit connection with or effect 
on interstate commerce.”156  It may do this either by bringing the activ-
ity out of the realm of the substantial-effects test—by ensuring that the 
statute regulates only the channels of interstate commerce or persons 
or things in interstate commerce—or by guaranteeing, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the activity in question substantially affects inter-
state commerce.157  For a jurisdictional element to ensure that a regu-
lated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the key ques-
tion is whether proof of the jurisdictional element also proves that the 
regulated activity has a connection to interstate commerce.  When 
analyzing the jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act, the 
Supreme Court would have to address two questions for the first time:  
(1) whether the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is sufficient 
to sustain a statute’s constitutionality; and (2) if not, how significant a 
restriction must a statute place on the class of activities reached in or-
der to be sufficient.
A.  Mere Presence of a Jurisdictional Element 
Nearly every federal court of appeals that has considered the ques-
tion has held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is not 
sufficient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality.158  Only the Eighth 
Circuit has held that an element’s mere presence is sufficient for a 
statute to survive a facial challenge under the Commerce Clause.159
156 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). 
157 See id. at 561-62 (finding that the GFSZA was solely a criminal statute with no 
jurisdictional element to confine its reach to activity that affects interstate commerce); 
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the Lopez framework 
and finding that a federal statute regulating the possession of child pornography quali-
fies as an activity that has a substantial relation to interstate commerce). 
158 See Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-19 (describing holdings of the courts of ap-
peals that have considered this question). 
159 United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998).  The Eighth Circuit, however, seems to have 
backed away from this bright-line rule in subsequent cases.  In its most recent Com-
merce Clause cases the court describes its holding in Bausch as standing for the propo-
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Meanwhile, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have all held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional ele-
ment is insufficient to guarantee the constitutionality of a statute un-
der the Commerce Clause.160
The cases dealing with the constitutionality of federal statutes 
criminalizing the possession of child pornography161 illustrate how the 
courts of appeals have ruled on this question.  Although most circuits 
have upheld these statutes, they have done so on grounds similar to 
Raich, reasoning that prohibiting the intrastate possession of child 
pornography is necessary to eliminate the interstate commercial mar-
ket for it.162 In the course of their analyses, however, these courts have 
often assessed the impact of these statutes’ jurisdictional elements, 
helping to illuminate the ways in which the Supreme Court might as-
sess the issues presented by these elements. 
The federal child pornography statutes make it a crime to possess 
or manufacture child pornography that “has been mailed, or has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which 
was produced by using materials which have been mailed or so 
shipped or transported.”163  When analyzing these statutes for their 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, courts are faced with 
the initial question of whether the mere presence of these jurisdic-
tional elements is sufficient to sustain the laws. 
sition that the particular jurisdictional element at issue sufficiently limited the reach of 
federal jurisdiction, rather than that every jurisdictional element does so.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1020-22 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing Bausch as 
holding that “the statute’s express jurisdictional element, which limits prosecution to 
cases in which the depictions or the underlying materials had been transported in in-
terstate commerce, ensured that each defendant’s pornography possession affected 
interstate commerce” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
160 Fischer, supra note 145, at 118. 
161 These laws include two statutes prohibiting the possession of pornographic im-
ages of children, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2006), as well as one prohibiting its manu-
facture, id. § 2251. 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It 
is well within Congress’s authority to regulate directly the commercial activities consti-
tuting the interstate market for child pornography, and [p]rohibiting the intrastate 
possession . . . of an article of commerce is a rational . . . means of regulating com-
merce in that product.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 705 (2006); United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 10 (1st 
Cir. 2004); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2000). 
163 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); see also id. § 2251(b) (prohib-
iting the manufacture of child pornography “if that visual depiction was produced us-
ing materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce by any means”). 
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Of the courts of appeals that have considered these laws, only the 
Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Bausch, has apparently held that the 
mere presence of this jurisdictional element establishes the constitu-
tionality of these laws.164  In that case, the court stated that the pres-
ence of any jurisdictional element guarantees the constitutionality of a 
statute because a jurisdictional element forces courts to conduct a 
case-by-case inquiry into the defendant’s conduct to establish that it 
substantially affects interstate commerce.165  But when examining the 
law in that case, the court stopped short of analyzing whether the par-
ticular element in the statute did in fact ensure that the defendant’s 
conduct substantially affected interstate commerce, apparently resting 
its holding on the belief that all jurisdictional elements guarantee 
such a connection. 
When considering the same statute in United States v. Rodia, how-
ever, the Third Circuit refused to allow the mere presence of the ju-
risdictional element in the child pornography statutes to establish 
their constitutionality and therefore took the further step of inquiring 
whether the particular element sufficiently fulfilled its task.166  The 
court relied on its earlier decision in United States v. Bishop, in which it 
expressly held that “[t]he mere presence of a jurisdictional ele-
ment . . . does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scru-
tiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.”167
In Bishop the Third Circuit had rejected the government’s argument 
that the presence of a jurisdictional element automatically rendered 
the statute constitutional because it required the government to prove 
in every case beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking victim’s car 
had been “transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”168  Although the court ultimately determined that the 
element did indeed guarantee a sufficient connection to interstate 
commerce, it expressly held that the courts must test the sufficiency of 
a jurisdictional element.169
Adopting the reasoning of Bishop, the Third Circuit similarly held 
that a court must test a jurisdictional element to determine whether it 
164 Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741. 
165 Id.
166 194 F.3d 465, 472-73 (3d Cir. 1999). 
167 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995). 
168 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)). 
169 See id.
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“has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.”170  The court 
stated that 
[a] hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element 
automatically ensures the constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact 
that the connection between the activity regulated and the jurisdictional 
hook may be so attenuated as to fail to guarantee that the activity regu-
lated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
171
Although it preceded Morrison, this language is reminiscent of that 
case’s holding that congressional findings showing a link between an 
activity and interstate commerce will not support a challenged law if, 
in the court’s judgment, the connection is too attenuated.172  In Morri-
son, rather than allow the mere presence of congressional findings to 
guarantee a statute’s constitutionality, the Court held that judges must 
examine the actual connection between the activity and interstate 
commerce to determine if there is a substantial connection.173  The 
Court expressed concern that congressional power to reason from an 
activity to its most attenuated and indirect effect on interstate com-
merce could “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between na-
tional and local authority.”174
The Rodia court saw a similar risk in allowing Congress to reach 
activities outside its power by including a jurisdictional element that 
did not sufficiently guarantee a connection to interstate commerce.175
To avoid this risk, the court held that the sufficiency of a jurisdictional 
element is likewise a question to be decided by the courts.176  In fact, 
unlike Bishop, the court in Rodia indicated its belief that the jurisdic-
tional element of the child pornography statutes was unconstitution-
ally broad because it did not limit the class of cases available to federal 
jurisdiction to those that substantially affect interstate commerce.177
In declaring the jurisdictional element to be insufficiently limiting, 
the court expressed concern that the element did not actually limit 
federal jurisdiction at all because nearly all child pornographers will 
170 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472 (quoting Bishop, 66 F.3d at 585). 
171 Id.
172 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). 
173 Id. at 614-15. 
174 Id. at 615. 
175 See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473. 
176 Id. at 472. 
177 See id. at 473.  Although the court expressed its opinion that the jurisdictional 
element was unconstitutionally broad, it did not so hold because it upheld the statute 
on other grounds. 
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use some materials—like floppy disks, film, or cameras—that have 
traveled in interstate commerce.178  In the court’s opinion, such broad 
coverage opened up the risk that Congress could use this type of ju-
risdictional element to reach cases with only an attenuated connection 
to interstate commerce. 
In the cases decided since, the Third Circuit’s reasoning has uni-
formly prevailed.179  In fact, although the Eighth Circuit has repeat-
edly reaffirmed Bausch after Morrison,180 it seems to have backed away 
from Bausch’s bright-line rule that every jurisdictional element will 
guarantee a connection to interstate commerce.  In the most recent 
cases, the court has indicated that Bausch instead rested on the con-
clusion that the particular jurisdictional element of the child pornog-
raphy statutes guaranteed the requisite nexus to interstate com-
merce.181  Rather than concluding simply that the presence of any 
jurisdictional element must guarantee such a connection, even the 
178 Id.
179 See Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-19 (noting that the Second, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have preferred the approach taken in Rodia).  
Fischer notes that an unreported Fourth Circuit case seems to have adopted the 
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and that the First Circuit also seems to have done so before 
Morrison. Id.  The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, however, simply refers to the fact that 
other courts have held the jurisdictional element to be sufficient, without providing 
much analysis with regard to the question of the reasons for those courts’ holdings.  See
United States v. Harden, No. 01-7869, 2002 WL 2004854, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2002) 
(per curiam) (“The circuits that have addressed [the constitutionality of 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B)] are in agreement that the statute is constitutional on its face.”).  
While the First Circuit held before Morrison that an element’s mere presence could 
support the statute, it did not consider the jurisdictional element’s mere presence to 
be sufficient to uphold the statutes in a later case.  Compare United States v. Robinson, 
137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge on the 
grounds that § 2252(a)(4)(B) “contains an explicit jurisdictional element”), with
United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 12-15 (1st Cir. 2004) (agreeing with 
Rodia’s assessment that the jurisdictional element of § 2251(a) could not support the 
law on its own).  The First Circuit still upheld the statute, but it did so on grounds 
analogous to those in Raich. See id. at 20-21. 
180 See United States v. Betcher, No. 07-2173, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15570, at *5-6 
(8th Cir. July 22, 2008) (rejecting the argument that the child pornography statutes 
are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, relying on post-Morrison Eighth Cir-
cuit decisions); United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1020-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing the “express” jurisdictional nexus and the required proof thereof sufficient to place 
the statute beyond constitutional attack); United States v. Hampton, 260 F.3d 832, 834-35 
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001). 
181 In Mugan, for instance, the court described Bausch as holding that “the statute’s 
‘express jurisdictional element,’ which limits prosecution to cases in which the depic-
tions or the underlying materials had been transported in interstate commerce, en-
sured that ‘each defendant’s pornography possession affected interstate commerce.’”  
Mugan, 394 F.3d at 1021. 
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Eighth Circuit has indicated a willingness to assess the individual func-
tioning of each. 
The Eighth Circuit’s move away from its bright-line rule and to 
the individual consideration of each jurisdictional element makes 
sense because it is likely that the Third Circuit’s reasoning is most in 
line with Morrison.  As Professor Fischer explains, 
[t]he Rodia approach is more consistent with Morrison than the Eighth 
Circuit’s approach, since Morrison did not state that the mere presence 
of a jurisdictional element in a statute will automatically render that 
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause (nor would the ab-
sence of a jurisdictional hook render the statute automatically unconsti-
tutional).  Rather Morrison, citing Lopez, held that the presence of a ju-
risdictional hook may (as opposed to must) render a statute 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause where that jurisdictional 
element “might limit [the statute’s] reach to a discrete set . . . of [intra-
state] possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or 
effect on interstate commerce.
182
Furthermore, a clear lesson of Morrison was that the Supreme Court 
will resist any attempt by Congress to circumvent the limits of the 
Commerce Clause simply by the inclusion of “magic words” or “pre-
textual incantations.”183  Instead, the Court strongly insisted that an 
activity’s connection to interstate commerce must be evaluated by 
courts and must not be too attenuated.  It is likely that in the case of 
jurisdictional elements as well, the Court will require that the connec-
tion they establish to interstate commerce be tested by courts and be 
similarly substantial.  The Third Circuit’s reasoning that the mere 
presence of a jurisdictional element does not render a statute per se 
constitutional therefore seems most in line with the Supreme Court’s 
precedent. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Jurisdictional Element in the Matthew Shepard Act 
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the mere presence of a ju-
risdictional element is insufficient, it would next consider whether the 
particular jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act suffi-
ciently guarantees a connection to interstate commerce.  As the Third 
Circuit made clear in Rodia, “[a] jurisdictional element is only suffi-
182 Fischer, supra note 145, at 119 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000)). 
183 See United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 
U.S. 801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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cient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality when the element either 
limits the regulation to interstate activity or ensures that the intrastate 
activity to be regulated falls within one of the three categories of con-
gressional power.”184  These “three categories of congressional power” 
refer to the three areas in which Lopez indicated that Congress may 
legislate under the Commerce Clause:  (1) the channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce.185  When analyz-
ing a jurisdictional element for its sufficiency, a court will look at the 
most extensive reach of the statute as limited by the jurisdictional 
element.  If any prong of the jurisdictional element present in a par-
ticular statute allows for federal jurisdiction over activities that are not 
guaranteed to have a sufficient connection to interstate commerce, 
the jurisdictional element will not be sufficient to sustain the statute’s 
constitutionality.186
When Congress seeks to regulate activities that are said to substan-
tially affect interstate commerce, there are at least three main types of 
jurisdictional elements that it may use:  “affecting commerce” prongs; 
“persons, things, or channels” prongs; and “materials in commerce” 
prongs.  Affecting-commerce prongs are the most straightforward in 
that they simply require the government to prove that the activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce every time it seeks to exert juris-
diction.  Persons-things-or-channels prongs, in contrast, seek to ensure 
that the regulation is of the person, thing, or channel of interstate 
commerce—rather than of a separate activity—thus bringing the regu-
lation out of the realm of the substantial-effects test.  Materials-in-
commerce prongs trigger jurisdiction over intrastate activities when 
the government can show that the defendant used some object that 
had previously traveled in interstate commerce in connection with his 
offense.  The ways in which courts have dealt with each of these 
prongs is helpful in understanding the contours of a properly limiting 
jurisdictional element and therefore deserve separate attention. 
1.  Affecting-Commerce Prongs 
In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that the words 
“affecting commerce” “signal Congress’ intent to invoke its full au-
184 Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473. 
185 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
186 Cf. Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1062 (declaring a jurisdictional element insufficient 
because one of its prongs allowed impermissible applications). 
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thority under the Commerce Clause.”187 As stated in Lopez, the “outer 
limit” of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is the 
power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, persons or 
things in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.188  When used as part of a regulation aimed at an 
intrastate activity that is said to substantially affect interstate com-
merce, this type of jurisdictional element requires that the govern-
ment prove in each case that the defendant’s conduct actually sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.189 In this way, these types of 
catchall jurisdictional elements do ensure, on a case-by-case basis, a 
sufficient connection to interstate commerce. 
Section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Matthew Shepard Act triggers fed-
eral jurisdiction when the violent crime “interferes with commercial 
or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged,” or “other-
wise affects interstate commerce.”190  This catchall provision would re-
quire the government to prove either that the defendant was engaged 
in economic activity or that his activity otherwise substantially affects 
interstate commerce in each case in which the federal government 
claims jurisdiction.  As the Court noted in Lopez, this type of jurisdic-
tional element requires proof of a substantial connection to interstate 
commerce each time, and would therefore guarantee that the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction is appropriate.191
2.  Persons-Things-or-Channels Prongs 
Jurisdictional elements that ensure that a statute only regulates 
persons or things in, or channels of, interstate commerce have gener-
ally been sufficient to uphold a statute under a facial challenge.192  In 
Morrison, the Court cited with approval a statute similar to VAWA pro-
hibiting persons who cross state lines from committing a crime of vio-
187 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000); see also, e.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 
U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (establishing that the words “affecting commerce” indicate Con-
gress’s intention to exercise jurisdiction to the full limits of the Commerce Clause). 
188 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-59. 
189 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 
1061 (analyzing the defendant’s conduct and finding fatal the fact that its “link to a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . is exceedingly attenuated”); Fischer, su-
pra note 145, at 119 (noting that a jurisdictional element needs to ensure that the con-
duct at issue affects interstate commerce). 
190 S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007). 
191 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. 
192 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5. 
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lence against a spouse.193  The Court noted that “[t]he Courts of Ap-
peals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction . . . , reasoning that 
‘[t]he provision properly falls within the first of Lopez’s categories as it 
regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce—i.e., the use of 
the interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods 
move.’”194  Similarly, in United States v. Dorsey, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
an amended version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lo-
pez.195  The amended GFSZA made it a federal crime to “knowingly . . . 
possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate 
or foreign commerce at a place the individual knows, or has reason-
able cause to believe, is a school zone.”196  Because the jurisdictional 
element ensures that the statute regulates the gun itself, and requires 
that the government prove that the gun has moved in interstate com-
merce, it guarantees that the activity will be within the power of Con-
gress to regulate a thing in interstate commerce. 
Section 7(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Matthew Shepard Act regulates per-
sons or things in interstate commerce and the channels of interstate 
commerce by prohibiting persons who cross state lines from commit-
ting crimes of violence based on the victim’s membership in a named 
class.197  As the Court noted in Morrison, this type of jurisdictional ele-
ment has been “uniformly upheld” by the courts of appeals as a valid 
regulation of the interstate transportation system.198  Similarly, section 
7(a)(2)(B)(ii) regulates the channels of interstate commerce by pro-
hibiting their use to commit a crime of violence.199  Based on the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dorsey, and the Morrison Court’s apparent 
approval of these prongs, it is likely that the Court will find this prong 
sufficiently limiting. 
3.  Materials-in-Commerce Prongs 
In contrast to affecting-commerce prongs and persons-things-or-
channels prongs, courts have generally held that materials-in-
commerce prongs are too broad to support a statute.  This type of ju-
193 Id.
194 Id. at 614 n.5 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir. 
1999)).
195 United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005). 
196 Id. at 1045 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000)). 
197 S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007). 
198 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 n.5 (citing Lankford, 196 F.3d at 571-72). 
199 S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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risdictional element triggers federal jurisdiction over a defendant who 
is not otherwise involved with interstate commerce simply because she 
used a material that had been in interstate commerce for some aspect 
of her crime.  The child pornography statutes discussed above contain 
this type of prong, and it is the presence of this materials-in-commerce 
prong that has led all but the Eighth Circuit to declare the jurisdic-
tional element of these statutes insufficient to support the law on its 
own.200  The child pornography statutes make it a crime to possess or 
manufacture child pornography that “has been mailed, or has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was 
produced by using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or trans-
ported.”201  The emphasized portion of this statute’s jurisdictional ele-
ment is its materials-in-commerce prong, which seeks to claim jurisdic-
tion over the purely intrastate possession of child pornography 
because it was produced using materials that had previously traveled 
in interstate commerce. 
Courts that have moved beyond the mere presence of these stat-
utes’ jurisdictional elements to determine if they are sufficiently limit-
ing to ensure the laws’ constitutionality have consistently held them to 
be insufficient.202  The basic problem identified in these courts’ opin-
ions is that a prosecutor’s proof that some material has traveled in in-
terstate commerce tells the court very little about whether the defen-
dant’s possession of child pornography substantially affected interstate 
commerce.  In this way it fails to ensure a sufficient connection be-
tween the source of federal jurisdiction (i.e., the materials) and the 
activity being regulated (i.e., the possession of child pornography). 
This failure is a source of concern for two reasons.  First, the stat-
ute’s failure to ensure more of a connection to interstate commerce 
means that the law does not do what Lopez requires a jurisdictional 
element to do:  guarantee that the regulated activity has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce every time jurisdiction can be estab-
lished.  For example, courts have noted that proof that a defendant 
used some materials (e.g., film, cameras, or disks) that have traveled 
in interstate commerce does not necessarily mean that that defen-
dant’s possession of child pornography has a substantial effect on in-
200 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-21 (discussing this circuit split). 
201 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2251(a)–(b) 
(prohibiting the manufacture of child pornography); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (prohibit-
ing the possession of child pornography). 
202 See Fischer, supra note 145, at 109-21 (surveying the cases addressing the suffi-
ciency of the jurisdictional element in the child pornography statutes). 
2008] Jurisdictional Analysis of Federal Hate Crime Laws 659
terstate commerce.203  These courts note the attenuated connection 
between the activity being regulated—the possession of child pornog-
raphy—and the objects through which federal prosecutors claim ju-
risdiction—the film, cameras, or disks.204  Rather than guaranteeing 
that the possession of child pornography substantially affects inter-
state commerce, these courts see the materials-in-commerce prong as 
an effort by Congress to claim jurisdiction over purely intrastate activi-
ties by using a jurisdictional hook that rests on an attenuated connec-
tion to interstate commerce—much as it attempted to gain control 
over intrastate violent crime by including attenuated findings in 
VAWA.205
The second cause for concern in these courts is that a materials-in-
commerce prong has no conceivable limit.  Through a materials-in-
commerce prong Congress could potentially claim jurisdiction over 
any type of criminal activity, including theft, murder, or even violent 
crime in general.  For instance, if a materials-in-commerce prong 
could support a statute, Congress would have the power to pass a law 
making it a federal offense to commit a violent crime, including mur-
der, if the defendant uses a weapon that has traveled in interstate 
commerce.  This statute would suddenly give federal authorities the 
power to prosecute nearly every violent crime committed in the 
United States because almost all violent crimes are committed with a 
weapon that at some point has traveled in interstate commerce.206
There are, however, few areas of control more traditionally left to the 
states than the regulation of violent crime.207  A jurisdictional element 
203 As the First Circuit noted in United States v. Morales-De Jesús,
[t]he jurisdictional element focuses on things such as film, cameras, video-
tapes, and recorders moving in interstate commerce, which are then used to 
produce child pornography.  As a matter of logic, this Commerce Clause 
premise has the kind of flaw so worrisome to the Supreme Court in Lopez and 
Morrison—it could justify federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted by 
the states, solely because the criminal used “materials that have been mailed, 
shipped, or transported in interstate [or] foreign commerce by any means.” 
372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004). 
204 Id. at 14-15. 
205 See Fischer, supra note 145, at 119-20; see also supra notes 170-179 and accompa-
nying text. 
206 See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Andrew St. 
Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez:  Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 113 (1998)). 
207 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no 
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Govern-
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that allows Congress to regulate nearly every violent crime committed 
within the United States cannot be sufficiently limiting to ensure a 
law’s constitutionality. 
Materials-in-commerce prongs therefore attempt to use an attenu-
ated connection to interstate commerce to reach a potentially limitless 
class of activities.  In this respect, they present courts with the same 
problems that the Supreme Court identified in Morrison.  As the First 
Circuit stated, the materials-in-commerce prong suffers from “the 
kind of flaw so worrisome to the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morri-
son—it could justify federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted 
by the states, solely because the criminal used ‘materials that have 
been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate [or] foreign com-
merce by any means.’”208 Morrison makes clear that the Court will be 
highly skeptical of anything that allows Congress to claim a general 
legislative power over areas traditionally regulated by the states, par-
ticularly when its method depends on the use of an attenuated and 
indirect connection to interstate commerce.209
It is important to note that the jurisdictional element held insuffi-
cient by these courts contains a persons-things-or-channels prong as 
well as a materials-in-commerce prong.  But in these cases the pres-
ence of the materials-in-commerce prong prevented the jurisdictional 
element from sustaining the statutes under constitutional challenge 
because a jurisdictional element will only be as limiting as its broadest 
prong.210  In fact, the presence of both types of prongs helps to illus-
trate the important difference between a persons-things-or-channels 
prong and a materials-in-commerce prong.  As noted above, a per-
sons-things-or-channels prong brings the activity being regulated out 
of the realm of the substantial-effects test, where it must contend with 
the requirements of Lopez, and ensures that the law is a regulation of a 
ment and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication 
of its victims.”). 
208 Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 14. 
209 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (“We accordingly reject the argument that Con-
gress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”). 
210 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004) (reject-
ing § 2252(a)(5)(B) because the statute’s utilization of the materials-in-commerce 
prong did not sufficiently cabin the statute’s reach to guarantee a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 
2006); Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473 (holding the materials-in-commerce prong to be “almost 
useless” in limiting regulation to activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, 
but nonetheless finding that the statute survived because the activity being regulated 
was substantially related to interstate commerce). 
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person or thing in interstate commerce or the channels of interstate 
commerce, rather than of some other activity. 
For example, the persons-things-or-channels prong of the child 
pornography statutes makes it a federal crime to possess child por-
nography that has itself been transported or shipped across state 
lines.211  In contrast, the materials-in-commerce prong makes it a fed-
eral crime to possess child pornography that has never moved beyond 
one state, so long as it was produced using materials that have been 
transported or shipped across state lines.212  The activity being regu-
lated in both of these situations is the possession of child pornogra-
phy, and it is this activity that must be shown to be within one of the 
three categories of congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  Under the persons-things-or-channels prong, if federal prose-
cutors can show that the child pornography was shipped or moved 
across state lines, they have shown that the pornography itself is a 
“thing” in interstate commerce over which Congress clearly has regu-
latory power. 
If, however, the pornography itself never moved across state lines, 
it cannot be said to be an object in interstate commerce.  In that situa-
tion the prosecutors must use the materials-in-commerce prong to 
claim jurisdiction, and they must establish that the intrastate posses-
sion of child pornography substantially affects interstate commerce.  
Because this activity falls under the substantial-effects test, all the re-
quirements of Lopez become applicable, and the connection between 
the grounds for federal authority and the activity being regulated 
must not be too attenuated.  Importantly, it is not the use of the inter-
state materials that is being regulated, but rather, as noted above, the 
possession of child pornography.  Had it chosen to, Congress could 
have regulated the interstate materials because they are things in in-
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (prohibiting the possession or manufac-
ture of child pornography that “has been mailed, or shipped or transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce”); see also id. § 2251(b) (allowing for the punishment of 
parents who allow their children to be the subject of child pornography, if the parent 
knows that the depiction will be transported in interstate commerce, or that the mate-
rials used to make the depiction have been transported in interstate commerce); id.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) (criminalizing the knowing possession of any “material that contains 
an image of child pornography that has been . . . transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce by any means”). 
212 See id. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (prohibiting the possession or manufacture of child 
pornography that has not been shipped or transported across state lines but that “was 
produced using materials that have been mailed, or so shipped or transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce by any means”). 
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terstate commerce.  But, in the case of a materials-in-commerce 
prong, Congress is seeking not to regulate the materials themselves 
but some other activity that is claimed to have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  As noted above, however, the use of materials
that have traveled in interstate commerce cannot be said to “guaran-
tee” that the possession of child pornography substantially affects inter-
state commerce.  The relationship is too attenuated and indirect, and 
because a materials-in-commerce prong leaves the activity being regu-
lated inside the realm of the substantial-effects test, such a connection 
is not sufficient to support the law. 
This is also the basis for the distinction courts have drawn between 
the materials-in-commerce prong of the child pornography statutes 
and the persons-things-or-channels prong of the firearm regulations 
in 18 U.S.C. § 922.  These laws prohibit the possession of guns by vari-
ous individuals, and in various situations, including the familiar pro-
hibition on the possession of a gun in a school zone.213  In fact, after 
the Supreme Court struck down the GFSZA in Lopez, Congress 
amended the statute to include a jurisdictional element.  After its 
amendment, that law now says that it is illegal to possess, in a school 
zone, a gun “that has moved in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.”214
As mentioned above,215 courts have upheld this statute as a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because of 
the proper functioning of its jurisdictional element.216  Courts that 
have considered the child pornography statutes have distinguished 
the laws in § 922, and their jurisdictional element, from the child 
pornography laws with their materials-in-commerce prong.  These 
courts have reasoned that a prohibition on the possession of an object 
of interstate commerce is different from a prohibition on the posses-
sion of an intrastate object produced using some interstate materi-
als.217  A prohibition on the possession of an object of interstate com-
merce is seemingly valid as a regulation of persons or things in 
213 Id. § 922(q). 
214 Id. § 922(q)(2)(A). 
215 See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. 
216 See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (“This ju-
risdictional element saves § 922(q) from the infirmity that defeated it in Lopez.”); 
United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the amended statute against a Commerce Clause challenge because the 
statute “contains an interstate-commerce requirement” in its jurisdictional element). 
217 See, e.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) (reasoning 
that a prohibition of possession of a weapon that has moved across state lines is not 
equivalent to a prohibition of homicides using such weapons). 
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interstate commerce.  But a prohibition on the use of that object for 
some other illegal activity is no longer a regulation of the object itself, 
but of the activity.  For the regulation of the activity to be a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, that activity 
must substantially affect interstate commerce.  If a jurisdictional ele-
ment does not ensure this substantial effect, the element cannot sup-
port the law.  As the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated, “[i]t is one thing 
for Congress to prohibit possession of a weapon that has itself moved 
in interstate commerce, but it is quite another thing for Congress to 
prohibit homicides using such weapons.”218
In this sense, it is clear that a persons-things-or-channels element 
and a materials-in-commerce element must do different things to 
support their respective laws.  For a persons-things-or-channels ele-
ment to ensure that the possession of an object is prohibitable by 
Congress, it only has to ensure that the object is, in fact, one of inter-
state commerce—i.e., that it indeed has traveled across state lines.  
But in order to support a law relying on a materials-in-commerce ele-
ment, that element must ensure that the regulated activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce—a much more difficult standard to 
meet.  It may be that there are some activities so intricately connected 
to the materials used in their commission that the connection be-
tween the interstate travel of the materials and the interstate impact of 
the activity may guarantee the requisite nexus in each case.  Under 
Morrison, this is a judicial question.219  But in the case of the child por-
nography statutes, it has been the near universal opinion of the courts 
of appeals that the connection between the materials used to create 
child pornography and the interstate impact of the possession of child 
pornography is too attenuated to guarantee this connection.220
The materials-in-commerce prong of the Matthew Shepard Act’s 
jurisdictional element prohibits the use of a “firearm, explosive or in-
cendiary device, or other weapon that has traveled in interstate or for-
eign commerce.”221  This prong, similar to the materials-in-commerce 
218 Id.
219 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“‘[W]hether particular 
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional 
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative 
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.’” (quoting United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995))). 
220 See Fischer, supra note 145, at 109-18 (describing the holdings and reasoning of 
the cases addressing the sufficiency of the materials-in-commerce prong in the child 
pornography statutes). 
221 S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2007). 
664 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 617
prong of the child pornography statutes, suffers from both dangers 
that courts have identified with respect to these elements.  First, it is 
unclear how the fact that a weapon has traveled in interstate com-
merce “guarantees” that a bias-motivated violent crime substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  In that sense, the connection between 
the trigger for federal jurisdiction and the activity being regulated is 
just as attenuated as that of the child pornography statutes.  Because it 
does not fulfill the task assigned by Lopez—to guarantee that each time 
jurisdiction can be established the activity regulated substantially af-
fects interstate commerce—the Matthew Shepard Act’s jurisdictional 
element is not sufficient to support the bill. 
Similarly, the materials-in-commerce prong of the Matthew 
Shepard Act opens up an area of criminal law even more traditionally 
regulated by the states than do the child pornography statutes.  States 
have always had the primary authority to regulate violent crime, and 
courts will likely look with suspicion upon a materials-in-commerce 
prong that would give federal authorities greater control over this 
area.  As one commentator has noted, a purely nominal jurisdictional 
element, such as one containing a materials-in-commerce prong, gives 
the federal government power over a nearly limitless class of criminal 
activity because “virtually all criminal actions in the United States in-
volve the use of some object that has passed through interstate com-
merce.”222  The materials-in-commerce element of the Matthew 
Shepard Act would, therefore, likely make nearly every bias-motivated 
violent crime committed in the United States a federal offense.  With-
out a very clear connection to interstate commerce, courts will be ex-
tremely hesitant to approve a jurisdictional element that so signifi-
cantly upsets the federal/state balance.  Because the connection 
between the fact that the weapon has traveled in interstate commerce 
and the effect of the bias-motivated crime on interstate commerce is 
indirect and attenuated, it seems very unlikely that courts will allow 
the Matthew Shepard Act’s materials-in-commerce prong to support 
the bill. 
222 St. Laurent, supra note 206, at 113.  The Third Circuit quoted St. Laurent in its 
decision in United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999).  After quoting the 
statement above, the court went on to say that, in the case of the child pornography 
statutes before it, “[a]s a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost 
useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, 
cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall 
within the sweep of the statute.”  Id.
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4.  The Matthew Shepard Act’s Jurisdictional Element at Work 
To illustrate the problems caused by the breadth of a materials-in-
commerce prong, imagine a scenario in which the federal govern-
ment seeks to claim jurisdiction over a purely local bias-motivated 
crime.  Suppose that while walking through a public park, the defen-
dant sees a man whom he believes to be homosexual playing a guitar 
for recreation.223  Because of the man’s perceived homosexuality, the 
defendant shouts derogatory statements to which the musician does 
not respond.  Because his insults failed to disturb the musician, the 
defendant grows angry, grabs the musician’s guitar, and begins to beat 
him with it.  The local police are called, arrest the defendant, and 
charge him with a hate crime.224
So far, this is a relatively straightforward case over which the local 
authorities have clear power to prosecute.  The defendant certainly 
committed a crime of violence that seems to have been motivated by 
his animus toward homosexuals.  Assuming that state bias-crime laws 
include sexual orientation as a protected class, the defendant will 
probably be convicted of a bias-motivated violent crime. 
Suppose, however, that federal prosecutors want to become in-
volved in this case because, for instance, the state’s bias-crime law does 
not cover crimes motivated by animus toward sexual orientation.  
Leaving aside the other elements of the case, the federal prosecutors 
would have to prove that the defendant’s crime substantially affects 
interstate commerce for jurisdiction to be proper under the Matthew 
223 Whether or not the victim is actually a member of the protected class is irrele-
vant because the Matthew Shepard Act brings under its scope crimes committed based 
on the defendant’s belief that the victim is a member of a particular class.  See S. 1105, 
110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(A) (2007) (prohibiting crimes of violence committed because 
of the victim’s “actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity or disability”).
224 This fact pattern is adapted from the case of Angel Santaurio.  Santaurio was 
carrying his guitar while walking to a local motel to see a band perform.  As he passed 
a bar frequented by homosexuals—at which he had been a janitor—a truck pulled up 
and one of its passengers yelled homophobic insults at him.  When Santaurio did not 
respond, the truck’s passengers got out of the truck and began to beat Santaurio with 
his own guitar.  The passengers pled no contest to local assault and hate crime charges 
and were ordered to pay more than $14,000 in restitution to Santaurio, in addition to 
serving three-year prison terms.  See Jon Wiener, Defendant in Hate Crime Case to Be Tried,
MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE (Mountain View, Cal.), July 23, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.mv-voice.com/morgue/2004/2004_07_23.trial.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 
2008).  Because Santaurio’s assault interfered with his ability to watch the band, and 
because this is arguably commercial activity, section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) of the Matthew 
Shepard Act may have triggered federal jurisdiction in this case. 
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Shepard Act.  To do this, they would have to prove one of the jurisdic-
tional elements in section 7(a)(2)(B). 
At first glance, it seems that the federal prosecutors would have 
difficulty showing how the defendant’s crime substantially affects in-
terstate commerce.  Neither the defendant nor the victim crossed 
state lines or was engaged in any commercial activity.  In fact, as a 
purely local, non-economic, violent crime, this seems like the para-
digmatic case in which a federal government of limited powers should 
not be able to exert authority.  Thus, if the jurisdictional element of 
the Matthew Shepard Act does in fact limit the class of cases covered 
by the bill to those that substantially affect interstate commerce, one 
would expect that federal prosecutors would be unable to prove any 
aspect of the element in this case. 
The outcome of this analysis is as predicted for all but the materi-
als-in-commerce prong of the Matthew Shepard Act.  First, because no 
one crossed state lines, section 7(a)(2)(B)(i) does not apply.  Second, 
the defendant used no channel or facility of interstate commerce to 
commit the crime, so section 7(a)(2)(B)(ii) also fails to trigger federal 
jurisdiction.  Third, because the assault did not interfere with any 
commercial activity of the victim, section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) cannot be 
the source of jurisdiction either.  Of course, the federal prosecutors 
are free to prove that the assault “otherwise substantially affects inter-
state commerce” under section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II), but because of the 
local and non-economic nature of the case, they will have difficulty 
doing so. 
So far the result is consistent with the initial assessment that the 
assault does not substantially affect interstate commerce.  Were these 
four prongs the only means of triggering federal jurisdiction, the bill 
would most likely be constitutional because the jurisdictional element 
seems to limit the class of cases to which the bill will apply to those 
having a substantial connection with interstate commerce.  Problems 
arise, however, when federal prosecutors attempt to assert jurisdiction 
under the materials-in-commerce prong of section 7(a)(2)(B)(iii).  
Here the prosecutors would have to prove that a weapon—the guitar, 
in this case—has traveled in interstate commerce.  To do this, they 
would simply have to show that the victim’s guitar had been manufac-
tured in any state other than the one in which the crime occurred.  
Most likely the prosecutors would be able to prove this, and the mate-
rials-in-commerce prong would therefore trigger federal jurisdiction. 
But is this the correct result?  Does the fact that the prosecutors 
can prove that the guitar was manufactured somewhere other than 
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the state in which the crime took place guarantee that this particular 
crime substantially affects interstate commerce?  Did the fact that the 
guitar could someday be used as a weapon with which the victim could 
be beaten enter into the victim’s mind when he purchased it in such a 
way that it would affect his decision whether or not to buy the guitar?  
Does the location in which the guitar was manufactured tell us any-
thing about the assault’s effect on interstate commerce? 
It is likely that the answer to all of these questions is no, and that 
the materials-in-commerce prong does a poor job of fulfilling the 
purpose of a jurisdictional element:  to limit the class of cases brought 
under the scope of the statute to those that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.  In fact, extending the analysis to more traditional 
weapons, it is likely that the materials-in-commerce prong will bring 
nearly every case within the scope of the Matthew Shepard Act simply 
because the defendant used a weapon that at some point had been 
shipped across state lines.225  This is exactly the problem that has led 
all circuits but the Eighth to find the jurisdictional element of the 
child pornography statutes unsatisfactorily broad.226
Although the jurisdictional limitations of section 7(a)(2)(B)(i)–
(ii) restrict the class of activities regulated to those that have a suffi-
cient connection with interstate commerce, the Matthew Shepard 
225 It is conceivable that Congress could prohibit the possession of guitars that have 
moved interstate because these guitars themselves are the “things in interstate com-
merce.”  But this does not mean that Congress could prohibit, for instance, the playing 
of guitars.  That is, Congress could not prohibit the playing of guitars generally.  Con-
gress could, most likely, prohibit the playing of guitars for money because this would 
probably qualify as “economic” behavior that is entitled to deference under Lopez. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).  Congress could also potentially 
argue that, because of its desire to eliminate the market for guitars, a prohibition on 
playing guitars is necessary to prevent the appearance of homemade guitar-like in-
struments that would circumvent the statute, but this would be decided on Raich
grounds rather than based on any type of jurisdictional-element analysis.  Similarly, 
Congress cannot prohibit the use of guitars (or any other weapon) to commit violent 
crimes without the crime itself having some connection to interstate commerce. 
226 See United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the materials-in-commerce prong of the child pornography statutes can be used as a 
justification for “federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted by the states, solely 
because the criminal used ‘materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in 
interstate [or] foreign commerce by any means’”); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 
465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some en-
tity or object involved in the crime be drawn from interstate commerce, does nothing 
to prevent the shifting of [the federal/state] balance in favor of the federal govern-
ment.  As has been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal actions in the United 
States involve the use of some object that has passed through interstate commerce.” 
(alterations in original) (quoting St. Laurent, supra note 206)). 
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Act’s jurisdictional element is likely still too broad because the materi-
als-in-commerce prong allows for federal jurisdiction beyond the lim-
its of the Commerce Clause.  Since the jurisdictional element does not 
sufficiently limit the class of activities to those having the requisite 
connection with interstate commerce, the bill cannot be distinguished 
from Morrison’s VAWA.  Like VAWA, the bill is not an economic regu-
lation, contains findings showing only an attenuated connection to in-
terstate commerce, is not an essential part of a larger economic regu-
lation, and does not contain a sufficiently limiting jurisdictional 
element.  Therefore, as with VAWA, the Matthew Shepard Act is likely 
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 
V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL HATE CRIME LAWS
Because the Matthew Shepard Act is unconstitutionally broad, the 
question that remains is how Congress should remedy this defect.  
Congress can easily amend the bill to remove the constitutional ques-
tion by simply eliminating the materials-in-commerce prong, without 
which the bill appears to be sufficiently limited to cases that qualify as 
“substantially affecting interstate commerce.”227  Even if Congress 
chooses to take its chances with the current version of the bill, the Su-
preme Court can still easily declare the materials-in-commerce prong 
invalid under the above analysis but maintain the rest of the law by 
severing the unconstitutional prong.  The debate, then, concerns the 
wisdom, not the possibility, of a federal hate crime law without a mate-
rials-in-commerce prong. 
One reason why Congress will likely hesitate to remove the mate-
rials-in-commerce prong from the Matthew Shepard Act is that this 
prong is the hook that allows the bill to reach most cases.  Unfortu-
nately for the bill’s supporters, it is precisely the prong’s strength in 
bringing a large number of cases under the jurisdiction of the bill that 
makes the jurisdictional element unconstitutionally broad.  It is clear 
that a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-in-commerce prong is 
much more limited in scope than a Matthew Shepard Act with such a 
prong because, in its absence, federal prosecutors will have to estab-
227 That is, the other prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element appear to limit the 
class of potential cases to those that “substantially affect interstate commerce” under 
the tests laid out in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Whether or not 
these cases actually affect interstate commerce is another, more normative, question 
that this Comment does not seek to answer. 
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lish that the crime in question qualifies under one of the other, much 
more limited, prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element. 
In fact, without the materials-in-commerce prong, even the mur-
der of Matthew Shepard would have been beyond the reach of the 
Matthew Shepard Act.  In that case, the gun that the defendants used 
to beat Shepard was, most likely, manufactured outside of Wyoming,228
therefore triggering jurisdiction under a materials-in-commerce 
prong.  But without a materials-in-commerce prong, it is clear that 
Shepard’s murder would not trigger jurisdiction under any of the 
bill’s remaining jurisdictional-element prongs because no one crossed 
state lines, was engaged in commercial activity, or used a channel of 
interstate commerce to commit the crime.229
Not only would a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-in-
commerce prong fail to reach the murder of Matthew Shepard, but the 
murder of James Byrd, Jr., would also be beyond the reach of such a 
bill.  In that case, the objects used by the defendants to beat Byrd, the 
chain used to tie him to the back of the pickup truck, and even the 
truck with which the defendants dragged him could all arguably have 
been grounds for jurisdiction under a materials-in-commerce prong.230
Absent such a prong, however, federal prosecutors would have been 
unable to prove the connection to interstate commerce required to 
establish jurisdiction over the crime, and prosecution would have 
been left to the state, just as it was without the Matthew Shepard Act. 
Without a materials-in-commerce prong, the Matthew Shepard 
Act reaches only a very limited class of cases in which a defendant 
crosses state lines, uses a channel of interstate commerce, or somehow 
interferes with the economic activity of the victim.  What, then, is the 
need for an essentially powerless federal hate crime statute that does 
not even respond to the two headline-making crimes that led to its 
proposal?
Given that an amended Matthew Shepard Act is essentially power-
less, Congress should abandon its attempt to pass the bill because the 
expansion of federal criminal law brings costs of its own.  First, federal 
prosecutions tend to make the criminal justice system less efficient by 
introducing complexities that do not exist in state prosecutions.231
228 See Brooke, supra note 21, at A9 (describing the circumstances of Shepard’s 
murder and noting that the defendants beat him with a .357 magnum handgun).
229 See Matthew Shepard Act, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B) (2007). 
230 For a detailed description of the circumstances of Byrd’s murder, see ROBIN-
SON, supra note 17, at 235-41. 
231 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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Even though the deletion of the materials-in-commerce prong will re-
duce the number of federal prosecutions under the bill, federal offi-
cials must expend resources before a prosecution can be brought to 
determine if the other jurisdictional elements of the Matthew Shepard 
Act can be met, even if it is ultimately decided that a case does not 
qualify for federal prosecution.  Second, the respect for residual state 
sovereignty is seriously diminished whenever the federal government 
attempts to exert power over areas traditionally subject to state con-
trol.232  Even a properly limited Matthew Shepard Act tends to under-
cut the power of the states to protect the safety of its citizens through 
the police power by pressuring them to relinquish jurisdiction in cases 
in which the federal government wants to get involved.  If state law 
were inadequate in some way, these intrusions may be justifiable, but, 
as previously noted, state law has been able to do exactly what an 
amended Matthew Shepard Act could not:  send the murderers of 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., to prison for the rest of their 
lives.233  Given that a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-in-
commerce prong gives federal prosecutors jurisdiction over a very 
small number of cases in which state law already provides more than 
adequate coverage, the benefits of a federal hate crime law do not 
seem to justify its costs.  Congress should therefore abandon its at-
tempt to enact a federal hate crime statute rather than settle for a 
Matthew Shepard Act amended to cure its constitutional defect. 
CONCLUSION
Lopez signaled an important change not only in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, but also in the way that the Supreme Court will ap-
proach federal legislation in the future.  In emphasizing that the 
Commerce Clause is, in fact, a limited grant of legislative authority, 
the Court signaled its intent to police the outer limits of the com-
merce power in order to maintain a proper federal/state balance.  
The Court made clear that it will not hesitate to strike down statutes 
232 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of tradi-
tional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial ac-
tivities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur 
and political responsibility would become illusory.”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 748 (1999) (“Although the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our 
federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their 
status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”). 
233 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
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that impermissibly encroach on that balance without a sufficient con-
nection to interstate commerce. 
Congress, for its part, has attempted to circumvent this limit in 
many ways.  The three primary tools at its disposal after Lopez are the 
jurisdictional element, congressional findings, and large regulatory 
schemes aimed at interstate economic activity.  In Morrison, the Court 
had the opportunity to provide guidance about the effect of congres-
sional findings on a Commerce Clause challenge, holding that these 
findings would not support a statute with an overly attenuated con-
nection to interstate commerce.  In Raich, the Court clarified the types 
of situations in which a particular regulation will qualify as a necessary 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.  Remaining after these 
three cases is the question of how limiting a jurisdictional element 
must be in order to withstand constitutional challenge under the 
Commerce Clause.  If the Matthew Shepard Act is passed into law as 
currently written, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to 
round out modern Commerce Clause doctrine by clarifying the law 
regarding jurisdictional elements. 
Moreover, the current version of the Matthew Shepard Act pro-
vides the perfect opportunity for the Court to place the final piece in 
this doctrinal puzzle.  First, because the Matthew Shepard Act is so 
similar to VAWA, the bill is clearly unconstitutional without the juris-
dictional element.234  Because the bill is unconstitutional without the 
jurisdictional element, the Court will be able to isolate the effect of 
the element and speak directly to this point without concerning itself 
with any complications that may have arisen from a different outcome 
on one of the other two Lopez factors (i.e., that the findings are less at-
tenuated or that the regulation may more easily be considered part of 
a larger economic regulation).  The ability to isolate the effect of the 
jurisdictional element in the Matthew Shepard Act means that the 
Court will be able to clearly present its reasoning on exactly what an 
element must do in order to ensure a statute’s constitutionality. 
Second, because the Matthew Shepard Act contains practically 
every type of jurisdictional-element prong currently present in federal 
statutes, the Court will be able to address all prongs and assess the 
constitutionality of each.  As noted above, many of the prongs seem to 
234 This similarity includes both the type of conduct regulated (i.e., violence to-
ward a person based on that person’s gender) and the findings relied on in support of 
each statute. 
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be constitutional based on the dicta of other cases,235 and it seems to 
be only the materials-in-commerce prong that gives the bill unconsti-
tutional breadth.  By drawing this contrast between the properly limit-
ing prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element and the unconstitutional 
materials-in-commerce prong, the Court will be able to give this area 
of law a level of clarity that it has not enjoyed since Lopez.  Ultimately, 
this would serve both the lower courts, in their efforts to assess the 
constitutionality of federal laws limited by jurisdictional elements, and 
Congress, as it attempts to craft laws in accordance with the require-
ments and limits of the Constitution. 
The controversial nature of the Matthew Shepard Act indicates 
that challenges to its constitutionality will accompany any attempted 
prosecutions.  Because the bill’s materials-in-commerce prong, which 
brings a nearly limitless class of cases under its scope, is squarely at 
odds with Lopez’s resistance to a general federal legislative and police 
power, the Matthew Shepard Act seems to be on a collision course 
with the Court’s new Commerce Clause doctrine.  Congress can pre-
vent this collision by amending the bill to remove the materials-in-
commerce prong, but the political popularity of federal hate crime 
legislation seems to indicate that Congress is unlikely to remove the 
one part of the bill’s jurisdictional element that gives it any bite.  
Should Congress leave it to the Supreme Court to decide the constitu-
tionality of the bill’s materials-in-commerce prong, the result will 
likely be a landmark case of modern Commerce Clause doctrine, the 
holding of which will define the role of the jurisdictional element 
throughout all of federal law. 
235 See supra Part IV.B.1-2. 
